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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CORPORATE
SETTLEMENTS
BRANDON L. GARRETT*
Abstract: Corporate settlements are proliferating in form and function. They in-
clude consent decrees, corporate integrity agreements, deferred prosecution
agreements, non-prosecution agreements, leniency agreements, and plea bar-
gains. Enforcers at the federal and state level enter an array of administrative,
civil, and criminal resolutions of enforcement actions against companies. The
reach of these settlements is global, and corporate fines have reached new rec-
ords, with penalties in the hundreds of billions of dollars affecting entire indus-
tries and economies. These settlements have not been studied together as a sub-
ject, perhaps because they span very different fields, from antitrust to banking,
environmental law, health law, and securities regulation. Private settlements, reg-
ulatory settlements, and criminal prosecutions each bring with them different
statutory and court-made procedures for approval in and out of court. Although
judges have occasionally disagreed about the scope of that review, it is under-
stood that judicial review is needed to ensure that the public interest is met. Con-
gress has increasingly enacted statutes calling for public interest review of corpo-
rate settlements. Yet when government actors settle with corporations, courts too
often presume the public interest and neglect statutory guidelines. In this Article,
I explore how standards in disparate areas raise a common question: how should
judges assess the public interest when corporations settle with the government? A
common field of law, and perhaps more important, equity, governingjudicial re-
view of these complex corporate settlements deserves study. In this Article, I ar-
gue that common equitable principles govern in the courts, but should be clari-
fied and developed further in judicial rulings, regulations, and statutes, using as
their lodestar the equitable concept of the public interest.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate settlements with the federal government are proliferating in
form and function. They include consent decrees, corporate integrity agree-
ments, deferred prosecution agreements ("DPA"), non-prosecution agreements
© 2017, Brandon L. Garrett. All rights reserved.
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("NPA"), leniency agreements, and plea bargains. 1 Enforcers at the federal and
state level now enter an array of administrative, civil, and criminal resolutions
of actions against companies. They may be entered and negotiated in parallel,
and settled jointly. The reach of corporate settlements is global, with major
multinational companies involved, as well as coordination among nations and
diplomatic efforts to resolve them.3 The penalties have reached new records,
with annual total penalties in the tens of billions of dollars affecting entire in-
dustries and economies. 4 These settlements have not been studied together as a
subject, perhaps because they span very different fields, from antitrust to bank-
ing, from environmental law to health law, and from anti-money laundering to
securities regulation. Private settlements, regulatory settlements, and prosecu-
tions each bring with them varying standards ofjudicial review and different
statutory and judge-made procedures for their approval in and out of court.
Generally, though, federal statutes and rules seek to ensure that judges examine
whether the public interest is met. Yet, when government actors settle with
corporations, often judges presume it is satisfied. In this Article, I explore how
standards in disparate areas have converged raising a common question: who
stands for the public interest when corporations settle with the government?
The public interest has become far more salient as corporate settlements
have attracted criticism from judges, legislators, public interest groups, and
scholars. Criticisms include the lack of transparency in federal corporate set-
tlements,5 the lack of public involvement in the settlements,6 the lack of indi-
1 BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: HOw PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORA-
TIONS 13 15 (2014) [hereinafter GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL].
2 Id. at 137, 228, 252 (describing the prevalence of parallel civil and criminal litigation). Statutes
have promoted such parallel litigation. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
(2012); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U. S.C. § 78dd-1(d). See generally Richard M. Strassberg et
al., Navigating ParallelProceedings, N.Y.L.J., July 24,2006, at 9 (discussing courts' general practice
ofallowing the government a stay of discovery only sparingly, even thoughparallel civil and criminal
proceedings are underway).
' See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775
(2011) (discussing the "shift" in increased U.S. prosecutions of foreign companies) [hereinafter Gar-
rett: Globalized Corporate Prosecutions].
4 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 5 6 (describing the explosion inthe size of corpo-
rate criminal fines infederal court overthe past decade); see PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST, BP
AND ITS BRETHREN: IDENTIFYING THE LARGEST VIOLATORS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND
SAFETYLAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 3,21 23 (2015) (detailing the rise in environmental, health and
safety fines since 2010); Jill Treanor, Barclays, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland 'at Risk of Further
Penalties, 'THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 16,2015,7:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
nov/17/barclays-hsbc-royal-bank-of-scotland-moodys-risk-further-penalties [https://perma.cc/3Y78-
MT25] ("Major banks have now set aside $219 [billion] ... to pay fines and legal costs since the
[2008] financial crisis.").
'E.g., Danielle Douglas, Senate Bill Targets Corporations ThatDeductSettlementPayouts, WASH.
POST (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econoiy/lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-
stop-corporations-from-deducting-settlements/2013/11/06/5felcl 80-4705-1 1e3-bf0c-cebf37c6f484_
story.html?utmten-.7b9c3b24 a9c [https://perma.cc/BHV8-D6XD] (describing proposed Government
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vidual accountability,7 the lack of management accountability, the small size of
the fines, and the effectiveness of the agreements.' Answers to those concerns,
I argue, lie in a common field of equity jurisprudence governing the judicial
review of complex corporate settlements. 9 As the Supreme Court has put it, in
an oft-repeated formulation: "[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go
much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public inter-
est than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved." 10
In this Article, I argue that common equitable principles should be developed
further in the corporate settlement context through judicial rulings, regulations,
and statutes-using the concept of public interest as their lodestar.
Traditionally, federal courts have deferentially reviewed settlement
agreements between parties, particularly when one party is a government en-
forcement authority. 11 The settlement terms were often simple and largely con-
fined to payments of fines and penalties or agreements to cease violations. In a
remarkable shift, across a range of civil and criminal contexts, the sheer scope
of agreements has expanded. Settlements encompass staggering fines in the
billions of dollars, and include complex victim restitution funds that must be
administered over many years. Settlements elaborate the compliance to be per-
formed, and require that outside monitors implement and oversee quite intri-
cate institutional governance changes within these corporations. 12 In doing so,
Settlement Transparency and Reform Act, noting that settlements "rarely spell out whether the entire
monetary figure should be regarded as punitive" and, therefore, subject to taxes).6
E.g., Complaint at 1 2, Better Mkts., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 83 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D.D.C.
2015) (No. 14-190) (challenging $13 billion JPMorgan settlement as having been negotiated "entirely
in secret behind closed doors").
'See e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: WhyHave No High-Level Executives Been Prose-
cuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/arficles/2014/01/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://penna.cc/JPC6-YH79] (discussing the lack of account-
ability mechanisms that impedes the government' s prosecution of major players behind the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis).
8 See, e.g., David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1410 11 (2014);
Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Blasts "Too Big to Jail" Policy for Lawbreaking Banks
(Dec. 13, 2012) (on file with author).
9 The AmericanLaw Institute is presently considering draft Principles of Compliance, Governance,
and Risk Management for Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other Organizations. See Principles of the Law,
Compliance, Enforcement, and Risk Managementfor Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other Organiza-
tions, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/compliance-enforcement-and-risk-management-
corporations-nonprofits-and-other-organizations/ [https://perma.cc/6MKG-TWXJ]. Those principles may
include discussion of judicial review and structuring of corporate settlements.
10 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'nNo. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
" For description of traditional rules and case law in civil and criminal cases, see infra notes 46
260 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 46 174 and accompanying text. On the rise in emphasis on compliance, see
generally Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958 75 &
nn.48 162 (2009) (providing background information on the origins of corporate compliance and
related regulatory frameworks); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk andRegu-
lation in a DigitalAge, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing the benefits and risks of third-party
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not only have private litigants, regulators, and prosecutors in disparate contexts
borrowed corporate settlement tools from each other, but perhaps as a result,
judges examine complex settlements that increasingly borrow terms, standards,
and remedies across areas, ranging from criminal to regulatory to civil. To take
one example, federal prosecutors began appointing corporate monitors in crim-
inal settlements in the early 2000s, and soon the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") began to do so in its civil settlements. 3 Private plaintiffs
set up large-scale victim compensation funds, and now prosecutors do so to
distribute restitution or forfeiture related to criminal cases. 14 Judges must reck-
on, in a range of areas, with the same functional problems of how best to hold
a corporation accountable for violations and how to use their equitable pow-
ers-apart from the power to impose legal remedies such as damages-to su-
pervise implementation of complex enforcement agreements.
Due to the increased prominence of administrative enforcement, the gen-
eral subject has attracted a wave of new scholarship, much of which has fo-
cused on executive power and oversight over agency enforcement, non-
enforcement, as well as the availability of Article III judicial review of en-
forcement and prosecutorial discretion. 15 Article III judicial review, however,
is not only informed by Article III norms and underlying statutes and regula-
tions, but also a body of principles concerning ongoing supervision of equita-
ble decrees. Article III invests federal judiciary with equitable power, extended
software used to assess and manage corporate risk); Brandon L. Garrett, StructuralReform Prosecu-
tion, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (discussing the recent rise of"structural reform prosecution" against
regulated firms) [hereinafter Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution].
13 Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC EnforcementA ctions, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 89 90 & n.3 (2006).
14 See GARRETr: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 122 39.
15 See, e.g., David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement,
93 N. C. L. REV. 1, 5, 10-43 (2014) (proposing a "three-layered conceptual framework" to guide the
formation of"administrative agency enforcement and compliance" mechanisms); Kate Andrias, The
President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1111 15 (2013) (arguing that the Presi-
dent should adopt a more transparent and coordinated administrative enforcement policy); Mila So-
honi, AgencyAdjudication andJudicialNondelegation: AnArticle III Canon, 107 Nw. L. REV. 1569
(2013) (arguing Article III review of private rights is more robust); Max Minzner, WhyAgenciesPun-
ish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 860 61 (2012) (discussing rationales for administrative enforce-
ment); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in
Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1016 (2001) (discussing the benefits and limitations of
out-of-court settlements with respect to protecting the public interest). On deference to administrative
agencies more broadly, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
315 (2000) (discussing the doctrine of nondelegation and its preservation of checks and balances on
powers in the U. S government); Dan M. Kahan, Is ChevronRelevant to Federal CriminalLaw ?, 110
HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996) (describing the Chevron doctrine and its particular importance in adminis-
trative law, arguing for its usefulness in federal criminal law); Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies
in Government: Separation ofPowers andthe Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (argu-
ing that administrative bodies outside the judicial branch have a role to play in determining the consti-
tutionality of certain laws); Henry P. Monaghan- Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1983) (same).
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to federal judges since the Judiciary Act of 1789.16 Equity is particularly im-
portant in corporate settlements, where parties envision judicial supervision
and detailed remedies over a period of time. 7 The equitable discretion ofArti-
cle III judges in public law or institutional reform litigation brought by civil
rights plaintiffs often seeking constitutional remedies is developed in an exten-
sive literature. 8 Howjudges should supervise structural reforms within corpo-
rations or to review consent decrees or other forms of settlements outside of
the civil rights context, however, is far less developed.
In this Article, I explore the body of equitable law that applies to corpo-
rate settlements, and propose functional categories to be used by judges when
deciding whether to approve, how to supervise, and how to adjudicate disputes
that can arise over the implementation of corporate settlements. 19 Judges have
long applied these concepts in some contexts, but have only just begun to ap-
ply these principles in others.2" They may grow in their importance. 2 1 The im-
plications may also extend to the questions of whether certain types of agency
actions to settle cases are reviewable, and what the scope should be of that re-
view. 22 The burgeoning literature on agency non-enforcement is beyond the
scope of this Article, however.
High-profile controversies have erupted over judicial review of govern-
ment settlements with corporations, as these agreements have expanded in
their ambition and their public significance.23 Fines and corporate prosecutions
have exploded as have the detailed terms seeking to hold companies accounta-
ble, and federal administrative agencies can similarly claim record settlements
16 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity ...."); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1 35, 1 Stat. 73, 73 93.
17 See infra notes 261 273 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., William Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies andJudi-
cialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 641-49 (1982).
19 Several scholars have examined whether prosecutorial discretion itself is "inequitable" or un-
just; instead my focus is on equitable relief obtained in enforcement. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt,
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1660
62 (2010); Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of
EquityInto ConstitutionalReview ofLaw Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 415 19 (2009); Dan-
iel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46
UCLA L. REV. 757, 789 805 (1999).
2o See infra notes 260 272 and accompanying text.
211 have recommended that suchprinciples be applied injudicial review of criminal prosecution
agreements in scholarly work, and as an amicus making recommendations to the court in a case in-
volving the question of what standard should be used when deciding whether to approve a DPA with a
corporation. See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 19 (D.D.C. 2015).
22 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) 'Unconstitutional' Laws, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1001, 1007 (2012) (discussing "enforcement-litigation gaps" and positing that the kind of con-
stitutional issue at bar should affect how these gaps are addressed); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing
Agency InactionAfter Hecklerv. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653,666 69 (1985) (discussing"judi-
cial review of agency inaction" as a "necessary safeguard").
23 See infra notes 46 260 and accompanying text.
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and an increased focus on ongoing supervision of corporate violators.24 Federal
judges seeking to protect the public interest in corporate settlements have been
reversed in significant cases where appellate judges counselled greater defer-
ence to government enforcers.25
Perhaps the best-known example among recent judicial rulings regarding
such a corporate agreement was by Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff in SECv.
Citigroup Global Markets (Citigroup 1), who found insufficient an SEC set-
tlement with Citigroup.26 Judge Rakoff focused on several defects, including
lack of accountability of officers or employees, the small fine, and the lack of
an admission of wrongdoing or employee accountability, noting that
before a court may employ its injunctive and contempt powers in
support of an administrative settlement, it is required, even after giv-
ing substantial deference to the views of the administrative agency,
to be satisfied that it is not being used as a tool to enforce an agree-
ment that is unfair, unreasonable, inadequate, or in contravention of
the public interest. 27
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets (Citigroup I1), re-
sponded with a reversal, disagreeing in part with that emphasis on the public
interest, and holding: "[t]he primary focus of the inquiry... should be on en-
suring the consent decree is procedurally proper.,28
That judicial interchange was no isolated occurrence. Similar rulings can
be found across a spectrum of different types of civil and criminal enforcement
agreements, as judges grapple with what degree of deference should apply to
the initial approval and then the supervision of corporate settlements, that con-
tain not just terms regarding fines, but other reputational and governance relat-
ed terms. 29 Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the Federal
District of Columbia recently rejected a DPA with a company for foreign brib-
ery, "looking at the DPA in its totality," and noting that not only were "no indi-
viduals... being prosecuted for their conduct at issue here" but also "a num-
ber of the employees who were directly involved in the transactions are being
24 See infra notes 46 260 and accompanying text.
25 Infra notes 130 139 and accompanying text.
26 SECv. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
rev'd and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
27 id.
28 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I1), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014). For a
discussion of the Citigroup H opinion, see generally Michael C. Macchiarola, "Hallowed by History,
but not by Reason,": Judge Rakoff's Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Consent
Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV. 51 (2012).
29 See Dorothy Shapiro, Lessons From SEC v. Citigroup: The Optimal Scopefor JudicialReview
ofAgency ConsentDecrees, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 63, 67 (2014) (describing "an overall trend, at least
at the district court level, toward more judicial scrutiny over proposed settlements and agency consent
decrees").
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allowed to remain with the company., 30 In a similar pattern, the D.C. Circuit,
in its much anticipated ruling in United States v. Fokker Services, B. V (Fokker
II1), reversed Judge Leon and strongly emphasized the discretion of the gov-
ernment to enter into DPAs. 3 1 Similarly, Judge John Gleeson of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York, raising "public interest" con-
cerns with a criminal deferred prosecution with the Hong Kong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation ("HSBC") over money laundering-related violations as-
serted a supervisory power to oversee and receive monitors reports in the
case. 32 The judge's separate decision in United States v. HSBC Bank USA
(HSBC I1) to make a redacted monitor report public was reversed on appeal by
the Second Circuit.33
Although each case involved a different civil or criminal setting, the con-
siderations that each judge invoked bear a close familial resemblance-they
look to the "public interest." That public interest is not synonymous with what
the government decides to do in a case. Instead, judges inquire into whether a
settlement in fact reflects the public interest. Equitable power is limited by a
set of standards for the use of injunctive orders to bind litigants in the future.34
The longstanding and traditional standards for injunctive relief include four
factors, including the balance of the injuries suffered by each side and the pub-
lic interest.35 But what do those broad standards mean for corporations enter-
ing complex settlements, where the plaintiff is the federal or a state govern-
ment, which presumably has highly-informed views of what is in the public
interest, as opposed to a private plaintiff bringing a civil suit? Settlements are
unquestionably important tools for the government, to obtain favorable terms
and avoid costly litigation with corporations. 36 Yet, corporate agreements are
complex and can affect many sets of parties, including the public. What does
the "public interest" mean in the context of, for example, public companies or
" United States v. Fokker Sews. B.V. (Fokker 1), 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164, 166-67 (D.D.C.
2015), vacated and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
31 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker II1), 818 F.3d 733, 750 51 (D.C. Cir 2016).
32 United Statesv. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5
6, 11 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017).
" United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCIV), 863 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2017). This
author wrote an amicus brief in that appeal. Id. at 137.
14 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (outlining "four-factor test"
judges should apply before granting injunctive relief).
35 id.
36See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Enft Div., Testimony Before the U. S. House
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services: Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S.
Financial Regulators (May 17, 2012) (on file with author). Forthe argument that judges should defer-
entially ratify such consent judgments, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in
Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article- 10 14&context-uclf [https://penna.cc/N6Q3 -B5G3]. For an economic argument
that more searching review is sometimes justified, see generally Sanford I. Weisburst, JudicialReview
of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1999).
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regulated industries, or where crimes were committed, with identifiable vic-
tims? And what if the settlement, despite having been negotiated by prosecu-
tors or regulators, appears to neglect the public interest in important respects?
There is still more reason why the seemingly disparate categories of civil and
criminal corporate settlements are converging over time. Some settlements
involve parallel negotiation and settlement of actions by civil, criminal, and
private litigants. Although a civil settlement may not involve punitive fines, the
parallel criminal case may include those fines, and although the criminal case
may not require ongoing supervision, the agreement with regulators may call
for such oversight. Thus, judges must consider not only the settlement before
them, but also the terms of related settlements that may be before different
courts, or handled internally by a regulatory agency.
In Part I of this Article, I summarize the areas, criminal and civil, in
which Article III judges review corporate settlements and what law currently
governs each type of settlement.37 In a range of disparate areas, as discussed,
judges have developed tools for reviewing complex settlements.
In Part II of this Article, I focus on how case law has developed responses
to the following factors that raise issues common to organizational settlements:
(1) reasonableness of any fines or other punitive measures; (2) adequacy of
any compliance-related safeguards; (3) presence or use of independent corpo-
rate monitors to supervise compliance; (4) cooperation with authorities in any
ongoing investigations; (5) the public interest as reflected in the substantive
law giving rise to the settlement, including the presence or lack of require-
ments unrelated to the violation at issue; (6) potential collateral consequences
of the agreement; (7) the interests of victims and third parties more generally,
including participation interests and the appropriateness of compensation or
restitution to any victims; (8) government interests, including those reflected in
the substantive law, and the effect of the agreement on other enforcers or regu-
lators; (9) the effect of the period of delay on statutes of limitations or other
interests; (10) the public interest in information concerning the underlying
conduct. 38 This is not an exclusive list of what might affect the public interest
in an organizational settlement, but these are commonly raised factors. I ex-
plore how such considerations operate in the settings in which corporate set-
tlements are negotiated. I argue that deference is due to enforcers that must
consider the public interest in the first instance. Less judicial deference, how-
ever, is due when settlements are reached in a relatively more informal manner,
outside of procedural and substantive guides in legislation or regulations. Thus,
17 See infra notes 43 260 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 261 335 and accompanying text. These factors were suggested by the author as
amicus in the context of a DPA. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C.
2015) (noting "the factors the amicus provided couldbe useful guideposts" as to the questionwhether
an agreement "is truly about permitting a defendant to demonstrate reform").
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judicial consideration of the public interest is far more important for a DPA
negotiated largely out of court, than if it was a plea agreement entered in court.
The judicial review described involves consideration of the public inter-
est, an equitable inquiry. In Part III, I turn to proposals to improve the public
interest review of corporate settlements, and not just through judicial review,
but through internal regulatory measures. 39 Congress has enacted legislation to
accomplish this goal and more has been proposed; no doubt further legislation
will be considered in the future. 40 The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has
pushed for more consistency in its process for charging corporations, both civ-
illy and criminally. 41 Those internal regulatory changes, however, have not left
any consideration for the public interest. Indeed, internal guidelines have been
adopted, but they lack notice as well as comment or participation by the public.
Settlements reached using such mechanisms should receive less deferential
judicial review than settlements reached using formal statutory or regulatory
means. Despite statutes and judicial review designed to ensure public interest
review and involvement of the public, high profile parties still enter into corpo-
rate settlements without meaningful participation of victims or public interest
groups. In this Article, I conclude that no matter what the mechanism, one fea-
ture ofjudicial review under equitable power must remain central to efforts to
improve corporate settlements: a careful consideration of the public interest. 42
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS
The public interest matters when prosecutors seek approval of settlements
of both civil and criminal cases brought against corporations, but unevenly,
depending on the posture of the settlement. Such agreements contain terms that
can be resolved at the time ofjudgment, like the payment of a fine or compen-
sation to victims, but also terms that may require ongoing supervision, like
implementation of a compliance program, or engaging in community service
as a condition of probation. The question is: what standards of review apply to
detailed agreements that call for such injunctive or equitable remedies and on-
going judicial oversight of corporations? Such a question implicates the equi-
table powers of a judge, and yet there is a tension between that power to su-
pervise an injunction issuing from the court and an agreement, in the nature of
a contract between the litigants. Although the government may bring an en-
forcement action in the name of the public, the public is not a party. The public
or interested groups, may seek to intervene, however, and even if they do not,
equitable standards call on judges to inquire into the public interest or possible
'9 See infra notes 336 353 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 336 340 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 342 349 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 354 358 and accompanying text.
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harms to the public or third parties.43 The role of the public interest in corpo-
rate settlements has long been disputed, and I describe how in criminal and in
civil cases,judges have sought to engage in public interest analysis, but some-
times judges and appellate courts have tried to cabin that role and defer more
broadly to government preferences and policies. That issue-what role public
interest consideration should play-has been increasingly raised in the context
of complex corporate settlements that pose more difficult issues for judges
than standard criminal agreements.
In both the criminal and civil context, judicial disputes have advanced our
understanding of the equitable role of judges in such cases. This Part begins
with an analysis of the role the public interest plays in criminal cases, focusing
on disputes over the role of judges in DPAs, but also highlighting the
longstanding role of the public interest when approving plea agreements with
corporations.44 Second, this Part focuses on civil cases, in which consent de-
crees non-controversially require analysis of the public interest, but where dis-
putes have arisen regarding how closely the public interest should be scruti-
nized, and where legislation has attempted to strengthen judicial review of
public interest considerations.45
A. Corporate Prosecution Agreements
In general, prosecutors enjoy enormous discretion in choosing where and
how to bring criminal prosecutions, as they should. The Supreme Court has
held, whether correct or not, that the discretion of prosecutors can only be con-
stitutionally challenged under "demanding" standards for showing invidious
selective prosecution. 46 Criminal cases, however, if settled in court, face cer-
tain prescribed judicial review. 47 Plea bargains, as this Article later describes,
must be approved by ajudge, because they involve a final judgment of convic-
tion entered in court.48 Judges have long considered the public interest when
deciding whether to approve and how to supervise plea bargains by corpora-
tions. 49 Ajudge must also approve other agreements between prosecutors and
corporations, particularly DPAs, in order to exempt them from the Speedy Tri-
al Act and rules that would normally apply in a case proceeding to judgment. °
41 See infra notes 252 253 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 46 174 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 175 260 and accompanying text.
46 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 64 (1996).
47 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 62 (1971) (requiring a sentencing judge to
"develop, on the record, the factual basis for the plea").
48 See id.
49 See infra notes 94 168 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 99 105 and accompanying text.
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In such settings, the role of the public interest is unsettled, but I argue in this
Section that the same types of public interest considerations should apply.
Criminal agreements between corporations and prosecutors have grown in
complexity and their importance over the last two decades, particularly in fed-
eral courts, but also in state courts. I have detailed the use of various types of
corporate prosecution agreements in a book entitled Too Big to Jail: How
Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations, and in several prior law review
articles. 51 Those developments have made the role of judges all the more ur-
gent in corporate criminal settlements. The focus here is on the judicial and
legal standards governing the formation of such agreements and the review and
supervision of them.
1. Plea Agreements
Many criminal cases in the United States are today resolved through plea
bargains and not a conviction after a trial.52 A judge must approve a plea
agreement, but the role of ajudge is distinct when the defendant is not an indi-
vidual, but rather an organization. Now, judicial review of plea agreements is
highly deferential in general, and the same is true if the plea agreement is with
a corporation. Judges have emphasized that they do not have a duty to approve
a plea agreement entered between the parties; as the U.S. Supreme Court em-
phasized in the 1971 case, Santobello v. New York, there is no absolute right to
have a plea agreement accepted by the court and a court may exercise sound
judicial discretion in considering whether to accept it or not.53 The provisions
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("FRCP") reflect that
view, including procedures for advising the defendant and developing the fac-
tual basis and voluntariness of the plea on the record and standards for plea
agreement approval, which provide the court with discretion whether to accept,
reject, or defer a decision on a plea.54 Thus, "[t]he plea agreement procedure
51 A number of my prior works also focus on the subject of corporate prosecutions. See Brandon
L. Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 154 76
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Garrett: Globalized Corporate Prosecutions,
supra note 3; BrandonL. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 917 (2008) [herein-
after Garrett: Corporate Confessions]; Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 12.
52 Criminal Cases, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases/
criminal-cases [https://penna.cc/32DS-CAAM ] ("More than 90 percent of defendants plead guilty
rather than go to trial."); see also Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea
Bargaining, THE ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/
plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/ [https://perma.cc/88EA-J595]; Debra Cassens Weiss,
Criminal Trials Have Become So Scarce That Federal Judge Had Only One in His 4 Years on the
Bench, ABA J. (Aug. 11, 2016, 7:45 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/criminal-trials_
become so scarce that federaljudgehad onlyone in his fou/[https://perma.cc/8WY4-56V3].
51 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; see also, e.g., In re Yielding, 599 F.2d 251, 252 53 (8th Cir.
1979) (citing FRCP 11 as granting courts "the right to accept or reject... plea bargains").
5' FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (b), (c)(3)(A).
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does not attempt to define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea
agreement. Such a decision is left to the discretion of the individual trial
judge. 55
The public interest is an integral part of what ajudge may consider when
deciding whether to approve a plea agreement. 56 Judges are more constrained
when a prosecutor seeks to dismiss charges entirely under FRCP 48, which
may be done with "leave of court," but where courts have stated that dismissal
is a central element ofprosecutorial discretion.57 Judges are highly reluctant to
substitute their view of the public interest for that of the prosecutor in the con-
text of a motion to dismiss criminal charges-to warrant such action, the pros-
ecutor's dismissal must be in bad faith or "clearly contrary to manifest public
interest., 58 Occasionally judges have done so, however, including in corporate
cases. For example, in United States v. N. V Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor
Chemische Industrie, an antitrust case, the judge rejected a deal to drop charg-
es against an employee in exchange for the corporate employer's guilty plea
because it went against the public interest.59 The case was of "the greatest pub-
lic significance," and the conspiracy involved an "essential lifesaving drug"
and the "public weal."6 °
The role the public interest plays is stronger when a conviction is sought
in the form of a plea bargain requiring judge approval. 6 1 In a criminal trial, the
public, through participation of layjurors, conducts fact-finding and reaches a
verdict. By entering a plea, the defendant waives the right to a jury trial and
agrees to receive a conviction. However, the role of the public interest does not
end due to that agreement between the parties. Federal judges have broad dis-
55 Id. R. 11 (e) Notes of Advisory Committee on 1974 Amendments; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262
("A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.").
56 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) Notes of Advisory Committee on 1974 Amendments; Santobello,
404 U.S. at 262.
57 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 30 & n.15, 34 (1977) (per
curiam). Thus, the D.C. Circuit had held that a judge could not substitute their view of the public
interest for that of the prosecutor in the context of a motion to dismiss. United States v. Ammidown,
497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51 United States v. Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 459, 463 64 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 631 (5th Cir. 1981) ("As long as it is not apparent that the prosecutorwas moti-
vated by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest, his motion must be granted."); United
States v. Bean 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he standard for review of refusal of plea bar-
gains should be closer to the standards for review of sentencing than for review of a dismissal which
does not involve a plea bargain under Rule 48(a).").
59 United States. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 75 F.R.D. 473,
474 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
60 Nederlandsche, 75 F.R.D. at 474.
61 See United States v. Harris, 679 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that ajudge may re-
ject a plea agreement that is "too lenient or otherwise not in the public interest"); Nancy J. King,
Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 133 34
(1999) (positing that negotiated plea agreements do not, inherently, conform with the public interest in
all cases).
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cretion to reject plea agreements. 62 FRCP 11 does not define the discretion of a
judge to accept or reject a plea bargain.63 Cases, however, have developed
what considerations may apply, including whether the plea was knowing and
voluntary, whether proper procedures were followed, whether any third party
rights are implicated, whether the agreement is too lenient, and whether the
"public interest" is affected.64
It is not a common occurrence that a judge rejects a plea. As scholars
have noted, "[r]ecitations of the need to consider the 'public interest' appear
repeatedly and with maddeningly little explanation in cases considering the
,,65
acceptance or rejection of negotiated settlements. Judges have long pos-
sessed and exercised discretion, for example, to reject pleas that are overly le-
nient.66 Judges may generally reject plea agreements "when the district court
believes that bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.,
67
Other factors that the court may consider include whether the anticipated sen-
tence would be appropriate.68 Judges also ask whether plea agreements harm
the judge's sentencing authority unduly, and judges have raised questions
about whether waivers of rights to appeal or certain waivers of constitutional
rights, like to effective assistance of counsel, implicate public interest con-
cerns. 69 In other cases, judges ask whether a plea involves abuse ofprosecuto-
rial authority or discretion, or might undermine public confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system. 70
The role of a judge in reviewing a plea agreement is deferential. The
prosecutor represents the public interest in enforcing criminal laws, and judges
may not second-guess the larger policies or priorities of the government or the
decision to prosecute a particular defendant. As the Supreme Court has put it, a
range of factors, such as "the Government's enforcement priorities.., are not
62 See United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that Supreme Court
precedent firmly established thatjudges may reject pleas at their discretion);Ammidown, 497 F.2d at
622 (holding ajudge can exercise "reasoned exercise of discretion" to reject a plea agreement, so long
as that exercise of discretion is not "arbitrary").
63 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
14 Harris, 679 F.3d at 1182 (stating that judge may reject plea agreement that is "too lenient or
otherwise not inthe public interest"); see King, supra note 61, at 134 35.
65 King, supra note 61, at 134.
66 See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 332
34 (1987).
67 United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Mil-
ler, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)).
68 See, e.g., In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 711 12 (9th Cir. 2007) (court must make an "individual-
ized assessment" of the plea agreement); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2005)
("A district court may properly reject a plea agreement based on the court's belief that the defendant
would receive too light of a sentence.").
69 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 60 62 & n.3 (D. Mass. 1999).
7' Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public
Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 572 73 (1996).
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readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to under-
take."'" There may be public interests in having public jury trials, for example,
but judges understand that plea bargaining, by its very nature, forecloses a tri-
al. 7
2
The public interest considerations that apply when ajudge is exercising
discretion in the context of a corporate plea are quite distinct. Plea agreements
involving organizations raise issues that individual plea agreements do not,
such as enforcement priorities, third parties, regulators, ongoing supervision,
and the separate Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.73 As a result, courts
have conducted individualized assessments in corporate plea agreements in the
past.74 In doing so, they have considered fairness, reasonableness, and the pub-
lic interest broadly, as well as a set of more specific factors that implicate those
broad public interest concerns.75 Specific concerns include rights of victims,
adequacy of compliance, accountability for individual violators, and other con-
siderations.
In conducting individualized assessments, courts have been willing and
able to articulate public interest concerns. For example, a federal court has re-
jected, as contrary to the "public interest," a corporate plea agreement present-
ed in a binding form that the judge felt unduly restricted his ability to impose a
sentence.76 Another corporate plea agreement was delayed while the court con-
sidered objections by victims, but it was eventually approved after changes
were made as consistent with the public interest. 77 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit approved a district court's rejection of a plea agreement
due to the fact that the corporation would have paid a fine but immunity would
71 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
72 For the broader argument that plea bargaining itself harms the public interest, see, for example,
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992) ("[P]lea bar-
gaining seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separa-
tion of the guilty from the innocent.").
73 Infra notes 231,275 281, 341348 and accompanying text.
74 Infra notes 110 112 and accompanying text.
75 Infra notes 275 332 and accompanying text.
76 JefFeeley & Janelle Lawrence, Orthofix Medicare Probe SettlementRejectedAgain by Judge,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2012, 5:49 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com (select
"Browse All Content"; then select "News Search" under the "News" tab; then search title "Orthofix
Medicare Probe Settlement Rejected Again by Judge").
77 JefFeeley & Janelle Lawrence, Merck Unit'sPlea over VioxxInvestigationAcceptedby Judge,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 19,2012,4:58 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com (on homep-
age, select "Browse All Content"; then select "News Search" under the "News" tab; then search title
"Merck Unit's Plea over Vioxx Investigation Accepted by Judge"); see United States v. Merck Sharp
& Dohme Corp., No. 1:11-cr-10384-PBS (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2011).
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have been given to a culpable individual.78 Judges have offered that plea
agreements may be revised, or the judge will reject it.79
In reviewing corporate plea agreements, judges have asked about the rela-
tionship between the entity and its officers or employees. 80 Judges have reject-
ed as contrary to the public interest corporate plea agreements that involved
immunity or non-prosecution of the relevant corporate officers or employees.8'
As one district court put it, "[p]ublic confidence in the administration ofjustice
will be eroded if it is perceived that ... an individual who operates illegally
through a corporation can escape prosecution altogether and retain the fruits of
his ill-gotten gains by having the corporation 'take the rap.,82
An additional public interest consideration for courts has been the pres-
ence of accountability in the form of probation supervision.8 3 In a case in
which victims intervened and objected, a federal court rejected a proposed
"binding" plea agreement, noting "the public's interest in accountability," and
stating the parties could submit a new agreement with probation and compli-
ance requirements. 84 One year later, the court accepted a revised plea agree-
ment, which, unlike the initial version, provided for three years of supervised
probation.8 5 This type of judicial review has been strengthened by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's 2004 amendments stating that even a corporation
with a compliance program "shall" receive a term of probation at sentencing
"if such sentence is necessary to ensure that changes are made within the or-
ganization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct."
86
Judicial review of plea bargains is not completely unfettered but it is not
purely deferential either. The judicial review of corporate plea agreements
8 Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462; see also United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 851, 853 54 (D.
Utah 1989).
79 United States v. Farabee, No. 2:07-cr-00160 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2007); Criminal Minutes Plea
Hearing, Farabee, No. 2:07-cr-00160; United States v. Buffalo Valley, No. 2:98-cr-0000 (D. Wyo.
Jan. 8, 1998).
8o See Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. at 853 54 & n.2.
81Id. at 853; Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462.
12 Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. at 853 & n.2.
83 See United States. v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 917, 921 22 (D. Minn. 2010).
84 id.
85 Bloomberg News, Judge Accepts Guilty Plea by Guidant, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 13, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/business/14device.html [https://penna.cc/M5EN-M9BQ]; Associated
Press, Judge Adds Probation to Guidant Plea Deal, CBS: MINN. (Jan. 12, 2011, 1:27 PM),
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/01/12/guidant-to-appear-in-federal-court-for-sentencing-2/
[https://penna.cc/U598-2FYR].
86 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1 (a)(6) (Nov. 2004). The commen-
tary section adds that not only may special conditions of probation include the development of a com-
pliance program, but "[t]o assess the efficacy of a compliance and ethics program submitted by the
organization, the court may employ appropriate experts who shall be afforded access to all material
possessed by the organization that is necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed pro-
gram." Id. § 8D1.4 cmt. 1.
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flows both ways, and judicial review can also importantly protect the rights of
criminal defendants.87 In corporate cases, courts may reject plea agreements
that unduly limit the rights of a defendant.88 For example, courts have rejected
agreements that would require waiver of appeal rights.89 Although judges may
not second-guess enforcement priorities,judges have insisted upon meaningful
supervision in the form of probation and they have raised questions when em-
ployees were not prosecuted. 90 Additional questions can be raised regarding
the severity of the sentence and other features of detailed corporate plea
agreements, such as appellate waivers. The role of a judge to review a corpo-
rate plea agreement to assess whether it comports with the public interest is
narrow and deferential, but important.
2. Deferred Prosecution Agreements
Over the past fifteen years, federal prosecutors have dramatically trans-
formed corporate prosecutions by relying, in some of the most substantial cas-
es, on a new mechanism: the DPA. 91 A deferred prosecution is filed with the
court and remains on the judge's docket until the term of deferral is completed
and the case is dismissed. 92 An NPA is an agreement to not file a criminal case
at all. 93 Unlike a plea agreement, which results in a criminal conviction, de-
ferred and non-prosecution do not create any criminal record for the corporate
defendant. The use of deferred and NPAs in organizational prosecutions has
become quite common over the past decade, and not only in the low-level or
misdemeanor cases that Congress had in mind when it permitted a judge to
defer a prosecution under the Speedy Trial Act, but also in some of the largest-
scale corporate prosecutions ever seen in this country. 94 There have now been
over 300 deferred or non-prosecution agreements with corporate organiza-
tions. 95 Over two-thirds were with public companies, one-fifth were Fortune
500, and one-fifth were Global 500 firms. 96 Some of the well-known compa-
nies that have entered such agreements include: AIG, America Online, Bar-
87 See, e.g., United States v. Forest Phann., Inc., No. 1:10-cr-10294 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2010);
United States v. BiovailPhann., Inc., No. l:08-cr-10124-NG (D. Mass. May 19, 2008).
88 ForestPharm., No. 1:10-cr-1 0 294; BiovailPharm., No. 1:08-cr-10124-NG.
'9 ForestPharm., No. 1:10-cr-10294; BiovailPharm., No. 1:08-cr-10124-NG.
9' See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), rev'd and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014); Guidant, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 921 22.
91 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 45 80.
92 id.
93 Id.
94 id.
95 Id. at 7; see Corporate Prosecution Registry: Data & Documents, U. VA. SCH. L. LIBR., http://
lib.law.virgiia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html [https://penna.cc/
BPG3-2ALT] (last updated Oct. 10, 2017).
96 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 45 80.
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clays, Boeing, Bristol-Myers Squibb, CVS Pharmacy, General Electric, Glax-
oSmithKline, HealthSouth, JPMorgan, Johnson & Johnson, Merrill Lynch &
Co., Monsanto, and Sears.
97
The public interest is implicated by both the approval and supervision of
DPAs by federal judges. Judges have only just begun to assert such a role; ear-
ly on, judges typically approved corporate DPAs without conducting any
meaningful review. 98 However, the applicable section of the Speedy Trial Act,
Section 3161(h)(2), refers to tolling time for "[a]ny period of delay during
which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to
written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the
purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct." 99 The
requirement that a deferred prosecution proceed only upon "the approval of the
court," makes the discretion of the court clear. ' 00 In agreeing to defer prosecu-
tion, a corporate defendant is agreeing to waive its Speedy Trial Act rights. A
judge must ensure such a waiver is appropriately demanded and obtained. Fur-
ther, ajudge must ensure that a case remaining on the docket is being properly
handled-in light of the specific language of the Speedy Trial Act stating that
the purpose is to allow the defendant "to demonstrate his good conduct."''
Thus, judicial approval and supervision is called for by the text of the Act.
In my view, any doubt over the meaning of such provisions should be
read in favor ofjudicial discretion. Other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act do
not require court approval, while still others limit discretion, for example, by
providing factors to be considered when deciding whether to grant a continu-
ance, or by supplying standards for whether a type of delay is reasonable. 02
The provisions of the Act were generally intended to "strengthen[] the supervi-
sion over persons released pending trial." 0 3 The Report ofthe Senate Judiciary
Committee on the Speedy Trial Act briefly discussed how several U.S. Attor-
ney's offices had been experimenting with diversion programs, noting a Con-
gressional desire to "encourage" that "current trend," and concluding that the
diversion provision "assures that the court will be involved in the decision to
divert and that the procedure will not be used by prosecutors and defense
97 Id. at 47 48.
98 See id.
99 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 See, e.g., id. § 3 161(h)(1) (providing a series of eight situations in which periods of delay
"shall be excluded," for example, set out in subsections (A) (H)). But see id. § 3161(h)(6) (permitting
a "reasonable period of delay" when a defendant and codefendant are joined for trial, and the code-
fendant's time has not run); id. § 3 161 (h)(7) (pennitting ajudge to decide whether the "best interest of
the public and the defendant" support granting a continuance based on "the ends of justice").
103 H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7401.
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counsel to avoid the speedy trial time limits." 104 Such text, describing the need
for the court to be "involved in the decision to divert," together with the ex-
plicit requirement that ajudge approve a deferral, clarifies ajudge's authority
to review and approve such an agreement. 105 Thus, the initial discretion over
whether to approve a DPA is necessarily combined with the substantive review
of that agreement and is joined with ongoing supervision of such a case.
Such agreements typically focus on not just criminal fines, forfeiture, res-
titution, or community service payments, but also on what I have termed
"structural reforms" reminiscent of institutional reform in public law litiga-
tion. 106 These provisions can include detailed compliance programs, such as
the hiring of additional compliance personnel, governance changes, and re-
quirements of periodic reporting and evaluation of compliance. Some agree-
ments require the retention of independent corporate monitors. Some agree-
ments (very few) call for the court to select or approve the independent moni-
tors. Still additional consequences include parallel settlements and terms re-
quiring compliance with civil regulators, or settlements with private plaintiffs.
Standard agreements require cooperation in investigations of individual em-
ployees; the agreements may impact those employees, including if the firm
agrees to waive attorney client or work product privilege. These agreements
typically last forjust two to three years. 107 The agreements may be negotiated
with multiple parties, including prosecutors from multiple offices, a range of
regulators, and attorneys representing victims; 108 some involve foreign gov-
ernments and their prosecutors and regulators. The agreements may also impli-
cate the criminal procedure rights of individual criminal defendants. 109
Courts have routinely conducted individualized assessments of DPAs
with corporations as part of their decision of whether to approve such agree-
ments. 110 In doing so, courts have remained deferential, as with any settlement
reached between parties at arms-length, but they have nevertheless considered
the public interest, reasonableness, fairness, equity, and other factors, in decid-
ing whether to approve such an agreement. To be sure, corporate DPAs are a
fairly recent phenomenon, and the vast bulk of these agreements have been
approved, sometimes after hearings, but often without hearings or written deci-
sions. Yet some courts have issued written decisions explaining the standards
applied, particularly in recent years as the practice has become more estab-
104 S. REP. No. 93-1021, at 36 37 (1974).
105 Id. at 37.
106 See Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 12.
107 For an overview, see GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 45 81.
108 Id.
109 United Statesv. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); United States. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp.
2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
110 See, e.g., United Statesv. WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO, 2013 WL 501784 (E.D.N.C. Feb.
8, 2013) (permitting deferral of prosecution in accordance with the DPA).
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lished. "' Those courts have approved the agreements as drafted after conduct-
ing such review.1 2 As will be described, such standards are consistent with
ensuring that an agreement serves to provide a meaningful opportunity for the
defendant to assure the government of its good conduct.
In reviewing DPAs, courts have considered if the agreement reflects the
seriousness of the charge, but also take into account other parties and employ-
ees who may be affected by these actions. For example, after conducting two
hearings, the Eastern District Court of North Carolina in 2013 in United States
v. WakeMed found that "after weighing the seriousness of defendant's offense
against the potential harm to innocent parties that could result should this pros-
ecution go forward, the [c]ourt has determined that a deferred prosecution is
appropriate in this matter." 113 The court examined the "equities," and conduct-
ed what amounted to a fairness and reasonableness review. "1 4 The court con-
cluded the government had demonstrated that "the conduct at issue was senious
and in need of being addressed by criminal process," but that the agreement
provided for sufficient fines, cooperation, and monitoring. "15 The court also
considered the need to protect WakeMed's patients, as well as "the protection
of defendant's employees and healthcare providers who are blameless but who
would suffer severe consequences should defendant be convicted and debarred
as a Medicare and Medicaid provider."" 6 The court held that, because "[t]he
parties having agreed to periodic review of the status of this matter by the
[c]ourt, any reports made relating to defendant's compliance with the agree-
ment shall be filed with the [c]ourt for its review. , 117 This court indicated that
it was taking many factors into consideration in its review of the corporate
prosecution agreement.
Courts have also noted in their review of DPAs that the agreements are
opportunities to hold corporations accountable for their actions during the de-
ferred period. Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the U.S. District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in approving a DPA with Credit Suisse, made the following
finding:
this [c]ourt hereby finds that the period of delay as set forth in Para-
graph 5 of the written Deferred Prosecution Agreement is for the
purpose of allowing Defendant Credit Suisse AG to demonstrate its
See WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO, 2013 WL 501784, at *2.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 id.
115 Id. at *1.
116 Id. at *2.
117 [d.
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good conduct and implement its remedial measures. Accordingly,
this [c]ourt approves the written Deferred Prosecution Agreement. 11"8
Judge John Gleeson, in the most detailed opinion that has addressed the subject
to date, concluded that the judge's role under section 3161 (h)(2) is not simply
to assure that the parties have not colluded to toll the speedy trial clock: "ap-
proving the exclusion of delay during the deferral of prosecution is not synon-
ymous with approving the deferral of prosecution itself." 119 Judge Gleeson
noted that "the Speedy Trial Act is silent" as to the standard for deciding
whether to approve a DPA. 120 As described in the Government's Supplemental
Brief, Judge Gleeson emphasized, apart from the language of the Speedy Trial
Act, the supervisory authority of the court as a basis for the court's active in-
volvement. 121 In doing so, Judge Gleeson proceeded to examine the terms of
the HSBC agreement and, in the process, found the fines, compliance provi-
sions, and other terms to be appropriate. 122 Yet, Judge Gleeson found one fea-
ture lacking: the court was not to be kept apprised of the agreement's imple-
mentation. 123 The judge, therefore, ordered the parties to file quarterly reports
describing "all significant developments," resolving any "doubts about wheth-
er a development is significant ... in favor of inclusion." 1
24
Most corporations that plead guilty are placed on probation; in contrast, a
DPA avoids formal probation supervision. To provide for analogous accounta-
bility, as in the WakeMed and HSBC cases, perhaps, the judges asked that the
parties provide monitoring and compliance reports to the court. 125 Other feder-
al courts have been less fulsome in explaining their approvals: "[p]ursuant to
Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 3 161(h)(2) and (8), the ends ofjus-
tice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public
and [the company] in a speedy trial."' 126
11' United States v. Credit Suisse AG, No. 09 352, 2009 WL 4894467, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2009).
119 United Statesv. HSBC BankUSA, N.A. (HSBCI), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev 'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017).
120 Id.
121Id. at *3-4, 11.
122 Id. at *2 7.
123 Id. at *7, 10 11.
124 Id. at *11.
125 Id.; see United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC I1), No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL
347670, at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), rev 'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017); WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-
398-BO, 2013 WL 501784, at *2.
121 United States v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No. 10 8233 (MF), 2010 WL 6606785, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2010); United States. v. Zimmer, No. 07-8130 (MCA), 2007 WL 2964252, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007); United States v. Biomet Orthopedics, No. 07-8133 (MCA), 2007 WL
2964201, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007). Section 3161(h)(7) permits a continuance "if the judge grant-
ed such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)
(2012). In his ruling inHSBC I, Judge Gleeson specifically disagreed that this broad "ends-of-justice"
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Federal District Judge Emmett Sullivan, the first to set out criteria for de-
ciding whether to accept or reject a DPA, has suggested that nine factors could
provide "useful guideposts" when evaluating whether a DPA is truly "designed
to secure a defendant's reformation" or whether the terms are "so vague and
minimal as to render them a sham." 127 That standard itself is limited and defer-
ential, but it touches on a range of factors that might accomplish the goal of
"permitting a defendant to demonstrate reform" when that defendant is a cor-
poration. Those nine factors include:
(1) reasonableness of any fines or other punitive measures; (2) com-
pliance-related safeguards; (3) independent corporate monitors to
supervise compliance; (4) cooperation with authorities in ongoing
investigations; (5) the lack of unrelated requirements that might re-
quire judicial intervention; (6) potential collateral consequences of
the agreement; (7) the appropriateness of restitution to any victims;
(8) the effect of the agreement on other regulators; and (9) the effect
of the period of delay on statutes of limitations or other interests. 128
Reviewing the two DPAs before him, Judge Sullivan concluded that the agree-
ments satisfied the standard of review. 129 1 develop how courts can use such fac-
tors, which I believe are quite useful, in Part III of this Article.
Without setting out such a framework, Federal Judge Richard Leon re-
jected a DPA with a company called Fokker Services, finding the fines and
compliance measures weak, an unacceptable absence of any compliance moni-
tor or requirement that the defendant submit compliance reports, and further,
no accompanying individual prosecutions of defendants. 130 Judge Leon was
the first judge to outright reject a DPA, by "looking at the DPA in its totality,"
and noting that not only were "no individuals ... being prosecuted for their
conduct at issue here," but also "a number of the employees who were directly
involved in the transactions are being allowed to remain with the company."131
Do any factors deserve special weight, or is this standard a totality of the cir-
cumstances inquiry?
standard contained in 3161 (h)(7) applies in the more specific circumstances of a 3161 (h)(2) deferred
prosecution. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161,
at *2 3 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev 'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Zednarv. United States,
547 U.S. 489, 497 99 (2006)).
127 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2015). The "guidepost
factors" adopted by the court were suggested to the court by this author as an amicus.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 31, 46.
130 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker 1), 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164, 166-67 (D.D.C.
2015), vacated and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
131 Id.
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The D.C. Circuit, in its much anticipated 2016 ruling in Fokker III, re-
versed Judge Leon. 132 The D.C. Circuit noted that the purpose of section
3161(h)(2) was to "assure that the DPA in fact is geared to enabling the de-
fendant to demonstrate compliance with the law .... , 133 That much is accu-
rate. I argue that the D.C. Circuit erred when it ruled that a judge may not re-
view in any detail the substance of the DPA. 134 I argue that the judge must
conduct substantive and procedural review of a DPAto answer the question of
whether a DPA is in fact geared to enable a defendant to demonstrate compli-
ance and whether the defendant's waiver of rights is voluntary and warranted.
Further, as I develop, a judge must ask very different questions when asking
whether a corporate defendant is being adequately required to demonstrate
compliance.
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the government's decision to seek a DPA
is like a dismissal under FRCP 48, rather than a decision governed by the text
of the Speedy Trial Act in which the placement of a case on a judge's docket
for an extended period of time is subject to its "good conduct" and the approv-
al of ajudge. 135 The D.C. Circuit emphasized throughout that entering a DPA
is like a decision to dismiss charges entirely, citing to inapposite authority that
the Executive Branch has "long-settled primacy over charging" and that a
,,136judge may not second-guess "charging decisions. No charging decision was
in question, however, but rather the content of an agreement to defer prosecu-
tion. 137 The Speedy Trial Act quite specifically treats entering a DPA different-
ly than a charging or dismissal decision, because it is a settlement waiving
rights and entered in court-one that implicates the judge in many of the same
ways as a plea bargain. 138 In contrast, ajudge would have no role or reason to
object if a prosecutor decided to dismiss charges entirely under Rule 48. The
defendant is not waiving rights if charges are dismissed entirely.
The D.C. Circuit has generally treated the judiciary as not "competent to
undertake" an inquiry into the substance of a DPA. 139 Yet, as discussed in the
132 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker II1), 818 F.3d 733, 750 51 (D.C. Cir 2016).
133 Id. at 744.
134 An excellent recent student Note and Case Comment have agreed with my views. See Mary
Miller, Note, More Than Just a Potted Plant: A Court's Authority to Review Deferred Prosecution
Agreements Under the Speedy Trial Act and Under Its Inherent Supervisory Power, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 135 (2016) (discussing generally judicial review and the benefits and drawbacks of NPAs and
DPAs); Case Comment, D.C. Circuit Holds That Courts May Not Reject Deferred Prosecution
Agreements Based on the Inadequacy of Charging Decisions orAgreement Conditions, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1048 (2017) (discussing Fokker II1).
135 Fokker III, 818 F.3d at 743.
13 Id. at 737, 741 43,745,747.
137 Id. at 737.
138 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012).
139 United Statesv. FokkerServs. B.V. (FokkerII1), 818F.3d 733,741 (D.C. Cir2016) (quoting
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
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prior section, judges conduct the very same inquiry when deciding whether to
approve plea agreements with corporations. 140 A DPA is far more like a plea
agreement than a bare decision whether or not to pursue charges under FRCP
48. As one scholar has described, "[1]ike plea agreements, DPAs include sanc-
tioning or punishing language, which a charging document would not contain,"
and "because courts have the authority to review plea agreements, they should
likewise have the authority to review DPAs."'
141
The D.C. Circuit erred in its assessment of DPAs in their relation to vic-
tims' compensation. The Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), as amended
after the Fokker case was litigated, makes clear that in a DPA ajudge must as-
sure any victims are notified and proper restitution is provided. 142 The Fokker
III court did not address such situations that implicate the public interest or the
rights of victims in its opinion. 143 Nevertheless, the CVRA makes clear Con-
gressional intent thatjudges carefully review proposed DPAs, inform victims,
and ensure that the terms of the agreement adequately compensate victims.144
The D.C. Circuit's suggestion that judges lack authority to review the sub-
stance of DPAs in any depth was legally incorrect. As will be discussed in the
next section, the D.C. Circuit was also wrong to suggest there is any separation
of powers or constitutional reason to interpret the Speedy Trial Act in a manner
to maximize prosecutorial discretion. Review of consent decrees in a range of
contexts requires judges to assess the "public interest" when deciding to grant
them; it is part of the federal judge's role and it does not raise any constitution-
al concerns.
One limitation ofjudicial review of DPAs with corporations is quite clear:
not all subjects permit judicial scrutiny. A court would be particularly deferen-
tial in reviewing the decision whether to offer pre-trial diversion to a defend-
ant. The D.C. Circuit opinion permits very little review of that decision. That
rulingjibes with rulings in which courts have long held that a defendant cannot
claim any right to obtain a deferred prosecution settlement, as all judges who
have considered the question have quite emphatically stated. 145As described,
however, the terms of the agreement itself may raise a range of fairness and
reasonableness-related concerns. Judges should, as Judge Sullivan did in Saena
Tech, strongly defer to the choices made when negotiating such complex
140 See supra notes 52 90 and accompanying text.
141 Miller, supra note 134, at 165.
142 Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (2012 & Supp. III 2015).
143 See Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 737 51.
144 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 856 F.2d 644,647 (4th Cir. 1988) ("A defendant has no
right to be placed in pretrial diversion. The decision.., is one entrusted to the United States Attor-
ney."); United States v. Hicks, 693 F.2d 32, 34 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Since pretrial diversion is a pro-
gram administered by the Justice Department, considerations of separation of powers and pro secutori-
al discretion might mandate an even more limited standard of review.").
1506 [Vol. 58:1483
The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements
agreements, absent unusual evidence that the agreement is a "sham." 4 6 Judge
Leon concluded that the agreement before his court was an utter failure and not
in good faith without applying Chevron deference, instead, applying his own,
later rejected, "totality" test. 147
The Second Circuit's 2017 ruling in United States v. HSBC Bank USA
(HSBC IV)-in which an HSBC mortgage customer from Pennsylvania asked
the district judge to order disclosure of the 1,000-page report by the corporate
monitor appointed pursuant to the DPA-reversed the districtjudge's decision
to disclose the document in redacted form as a public document. 148 In HSBC1,
a prosecution of the bank for billions of dollars' worth of money-laundering
and sanctions related violations that resulted in "the largest penalty in any
[Bank Secrecy Act] prosecution to date,"149 the bank received a DPA. The
agreement received high-profile criticism, including on Capitol Hill. ' 0 In ap-
proving the agreement, Federal District Judge John Gleeson noted this "heavy
public criticism," but approved it, while ordering the five-year corporate moni-
tor supply summaries of the ongoing implementation of a new compliance
program to the court. 151 The reports were not positive: the monitor apparently
reported "significant concerns about the pace of... progress" in compliance
and new possible violations, as has the company.152
In response to the request by a member of the public, Judge Gleeson de-
cided to release the 2016 monitors report, in a redacted form. 53 HSBC,joined
141 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2015).
147 United States v. Fokker Servs. BV. (Fokker 1), 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164, 16667 (D.D.C.
2015), vacated and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
141 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI), 863 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2017).
149 Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank
USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) (on file with DOJ); see Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, HSBC to Pay 1.92 billion to Settle Charges of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2012,4:10 PM), https://dealbook.nyimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-
money-laundering/ [https://perma.cc/29TD-9W94].
150 Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, Justice Department's Failure to Prosecute Criminal
Behavior inHSBC Scandal Is Inexcusable (Dec. 13, 2012) (onfile with author); Press Release, Sena-
tor Jeff Merkley, supra note 8.
151 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7,
11 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at
BI Bl, United States v. HSBC BankUSA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (No.
1:12-CR-763) (detailing the requirements of the monitor's report in Attachment B).
152 HSBCHoldings PLC. Annual Financial Report, LONDON STOCK EXCH. (Mar. 18, 2016, 4:40
PM), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-news-detail/HSBA/
1274443 8.html [https://perma.cc/PC2J-RKUF]; see Greg Farrell, HSBC Falls Short on Compliance,
Monitor Said to Report, MONEY WEB (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:04 AM), https://www.moneyweb.co.za/
news/intemational/hsbc-falls-short-on-compliance-monitor-said-to-report [https://perma.cc/CL6F-
2PL9].
153 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI1), No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 347670,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), rev'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017).
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by the government, then appealed the ruling. I view such reports as of enor-
mous public interest, and should note that I argued in an amicus brief that for
that reason and based on the Speedy Trial Act itself, the district judge acted
well within his discretion to order that the monitor's report be made public. 154 I
maintained that "there is a public interest in knowing if the monitorship is ac-
complishing the ends ofjustice contemplated by the DPA" and described how
the Speedy Trial Act supports judicial review and supervision of the implemen-
tation of DPAs, as does standard practice in a range of civil and criminal set-
tings. 155
The Second Circuit did address many of those arguments, and the panel
largely rejected them. Indeed, the panel included language that went beyond
the circumstances concerning disclosure of a corporate monitor's report and
stated thatjudges have "no freestanding supervisory power" to review and ap-
prove such agreements or ensure compliance with them. 156 Judge Gleeson, in
approving the DPA, emphasized the "heavy public criticism" of the deal's leni-
ent treatment of the bank, which avoided a conviction, and its employees, none
of whom were prosecuted. 157 In ordering that the monitor's reports be dis-
closed, the judge said it was "appropriate and desirable for the public to be
interested and informed now in the progress of the arrangement between DOJ
and HSBC that the government chose to make the centerpiece of a federal
criminal case .... 15 That reasoning-in part depending on a First Amend-
ment question whether the monitor's report was ajudicial document-and that
constitutional question are not ones I address here. 159
In response, the Second Circuit panel never squarely addressed the ques-
tion of the public interest. Like the D.C. Circuit, the Second Circuit relied upon
inapposite cases concerning a prosecutor's charging discretion, and used the
same troubling reasoning that statutes like the Speedy Trial Act should be in-
terpreted to maximize prosecutorial discretion. 160 The panel interpreted the
discretion that the Speedy Trial Act conveys as a bar on ajudge evaluating the
merits of a DPA before approving it. 161 The panel, however, did note that the
monitor's report might become a judicial document subject to public disclosure
if disputes later made the document relevant to judicial decision making. The
154 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012); BriefofAmicus Curiae Professor Brandon L. Garrett in Support
ofAppellee at 20, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCIV), 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. Oct. 27,
2016) [hereinafter Garrett: Amicus Briefi.
155 Garrett: Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 20.
156 HSBC IV, 863 F.3d at 135 37.
157 HSBC1I, 2016 WL 347670, at *5.
158 id.
159 See HSBCIV, 863 F.3d at 129, 134 35.
160 Id. at 137.
161 Id. at 138.
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panel also noted that if any misconduct came to the court's attention, its super-
visory power would justify monitoring the implementation of the agreement. 162
The Second Circuit should have also looked more carefully at the purpos-
es of and authority for judicial supervision of criminal matters. That panel sug-
gested that authority to review the merits of a DPA would go so far as to "re-
jigger the historical allocation of authority between the courts and the Execu-
tive." 163 The panel cited no historical support for the proposition that federal
judges must approve agreements without reviewing their substance, however.
The panel did not acknowledge the large body of evidence concerning the rou-
tine and standard disclosure of monitor reports in a wide range of prosecution
settings; it is not as if shrouding a monitorship in secrecy is somehow an im-
portant part of the prosecutorial role (indeed the monitor is defined as inde-
pendent of the prosecution and the corporate defendant). 164 Moreover, the
Speedy Trial Act, like the provisions of FRCP 11, including the procedures for
advising the defendant and developing the factual basis and voluntariness of
the plea on the record set out in FRCP 11 (b), each call for substantive review. 165
In the case of a plea and in the case of a DPA, judges have a common need to
inquire into a series of subjects. For example, defendants must be informed of
the consequences of waiving their Speedy Trial Act rights, just as they must be
informed of the significance of a waiver of rights when pleading guilty.
Additionally, case law and standards for plea agreement approval can in-
form the standard for the approval of DPAs, where under FRCP 11, the court
has discretion whether to accept or reject the plea, or defer a decision. 166 The
factors cited by Judge Sullivan, for example, mirror (and were in part drawn
from) the factors that have arisen in cases in which judges have considered
corporate plea agreements. 167 As one student argues-and I agree-"the fact
that judicial review of plea agreements is not unfettered does not mean that no
such review exists: courts can review plea agreements and DPAs without pass-
ing judgment on the charging decisions themselves." 168
To be sure, judges could be more explicitly empowered to conduct sub-
stantive review of corporate agreements by statute, to ensure that prosecutors
do pursue the public interest when they settle with corporations. Concurring
separately in the Second Circuit ruling in HSBC IV, Judge Rosemary Pooler
wrote that, as I have described, the relevant provisions of the Speedy Trial Act
were clearly written with individual diversion in mind and not large corpora-
162 Id. at 137.
163 Id. at 138.
164 Garrett: Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 16 19.
165 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
166 FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 1(c)(3)(A).
167 See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2015).
168 Miller, supra note 134, at 167.
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tions, and called upon Congress to enact legislation along the lines of legisla-
tion introduced to formalize judicial review over DPAs. 169 In my view, the
Second Circuit was incorrect. There is nothing vague about the language of the
Speedy Trial Act. The language of the current Speedy Trial Act already pro-
vides authority to substantively review such agreements, just as they would if
it were a plea agreement. 170 Case law can and should cement the standards for
judicial review, and judges have begun to do so already. As will be described
later, in a range of regulatory areas, the procedures developed by courts or set
out in statutes are designed precisely to accomplish that goal: to introduce
broader public interest consideration when important settlements are negotiat-
ed with companies, but to clearly define the relevant factors and standards.
3. Non-Prosecution Agreements
In some instances, government enforcers can avoid judicial review entire-
ly. They can decline to bring a case at all, but in doing so, they do not obtain a
remedy. As an alternative, government enforcers can rely on NPAs with an or-
ganization. A non-prosecution is not filed with a judge and, therefore, cannot
be reviewed by ajudge; such an agreement states that prosecutors will not file
if the corporation complies with its terms. 171 Antitrust immunity agreements
also fall into this category. Although distinct from a declination, such an
agreement cannot implicate supervisory authority of a court because nothing is
filed in court and the court is not asked to approve it.'7 2 Perhaps a company
could sue to enforce an NPA as a contract if they argued that prosecutors failed
to uphold their end of the bargain. For instance, in an antitrust case in the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court ultimately held that a company could bring
a due process challenge to a prosecutor's declaration that the company was in
breach of its settlement. 173 The Third Circuit held also, however, that the judge
had no power to enjoin, before the indictment, the criminal charges that prose-
169 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC IV), 863 F.3d 125, 142-44 (2d Cir. 2017)
(Pooler, J., concurring).
170 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
171 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012). See generally Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department
ofJustice Consent Decrees Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1973) (discussing critiques ofcon-
sent decrees for excluding third party interests in settlements and their general lack of transparency,
and proposing avenues for reform) [hereinafter ITT Dividend].
172 The General Accountability Office has criticized the lack of criteria for deciding whether a
company receives a deferred or a non-prosecution agreement. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-09-636T, CORPORATE CRIME: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ'S USE AND OVER-
SIGHT OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 4, 9, 11, (2009) (noting
that prosecutors frequently consider non-objective factors, such as a "company's cooperation with the
investigation, the collateral consequences of a criminal prosecution, and any remedial measures [a]
company had taken," when deciding whether or not to pursue a DPA or NPA).
173 Stolt-Nielson- S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2006).
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cutors were bringing in response to the alleged breach. 174 These NPAs, there-
fore, enable corporate settlements to escape judicial review entirely.
B. Civil Regulatory Agreements
Corporate settlements also often involve agreements with federal admin-
istrative agencies outside of criminal prosecutions. A wide range of federal
administrative agencies settle the vast majority of their enforcement actions
using civil consent decrees. 175 Indeed, in some contexts, like under certain en-
vironmental statutes, cases must be settled using consent decrees, as opposed
to out-of-court settlements. 176 Consent decrees are settlement agreements,
much like contracts, but they are approved by a court, so that they involve ju-
dicial review. The agency can secure fines and impose conditions on an organ-
ization, and the text of the agreement can also set a template for conduct by
other members of industry. 1
77
Although consent decrees may accomplish regulatory objectives, admin-
istrative agencies must permit public notice and participation rights when en-
gaging in regulation or issuing orders. The rules are less clear, however, when
these administrative agencies engage in enforcement. The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA") protects interests of affected members of the public when
agencies engage in rulemaking, including the requirement that notice and an
opportunity to comment be afforded, as well as other procedures. 178 The pur-
pose of these rules is to permit public participation, as well as provide infor-
mation access and an opportunity for deliberation. 179 The APA provides for
judicial review of agency decision-making, using a range of standards of re-
view. 80 Other statutes supplement that judicial review, such as the Hobbs Ju-
dicial Review Act, which grants a right to intervene in actions before federal
1741 Id. For a discussion of the case, see Garrett: StructuralReform Prosecution, supra note 12, at
929 30.
175 Kristi Smith, Who's Suing Whom: A Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit Environ-
mentalActions Brought Under EPA -AdministeredStatutes, 1995 2000,29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359,
387 (2004); see SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
171 See generally Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: ConsentDecrees, Settlements and
Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, http://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/Viewcontent.cgi?article-1023&context-uclf [https://penna.cc/8Y75-HDP9] (dis-
cussing how limiting "the range of commitments the government may offer" in settlements can restrict
the full effect of consent decrees that have played a key role in environmental policy).
177 See infra notes 221 241 and accompanying text.
17' Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 559, 701 706 (2012 & Supps. II 2014, IV
2016).
179 TOM C. CLARKE, U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL' S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947); Richard A. Posner, The Rise andFall ofAdministrative Law, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 962 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transfor-
mation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755 56 (1996).
S' 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). Regarding the complexity of these standards of review, see, for exam-
ple, David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 530 (2011).
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agencies, providing that "[c]ommunities, associations, corporations, firms, and
individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may inter-
vene in any proceeding to review the order." 181
If agencies fail to comport with the requisite notice and comment proce-
dural provisions, then the courts may invalidate their rulemaking. 8 2 If they do
comply, courts will employ deferential scrutiny to their legal interpretations,
even if statutes are ambiguous, under the Chevron doctrine. 18 3 Some scholars
worry that the procedural requirements of the APA are unwieldy and give
agencies incentives to act informally outside that process, such as by issuing
interpretive rules or guidance that is not binding like a regulation. 84 Another
way agencies can act outside the rulemaking process is through enforcement
actions, which can be used to ensure that non-compliant actors are held ac-
countable, but which can also set an informal precedent for accountability un-
der regulatory schemes.
The same rules do not apply when agencies act through enforcement and
not through rulemaking or orders. In general, enforcement discretion is not re-
viewable, and agencies have broad discretion regarding regulation-enforcement
and regulatory targets. 18 5 A decision not to enforce is not reviewable under the
doctrine of Heckler v Chaney. 186 Nor are agency plans for conducting enforce-
ment or monitoring, 8 7 or decisions on how to allocate enforcement funds. 188
When an agency does enter into civil settlements and seeks judicial ratifi-
cation of the settlement through a consent decree, judges have a responsibility
to review that settlement, but often this role is undefined. In some areas, legis-
lation has defined thatjudicial rule, as with judicial review of agency rulemak-
ing, but the courts have been mixed in their interpretation of those provisions,
as I develop in the sections that follow.
181 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (2012).
182 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142 43 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Am. Wa-
ter Works Ass'nv. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 75 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
183 ChevronU.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 45 (1984); see, e.g.,
Peter L. Strauss, "Deference "Is Too Confusing Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore
Weight, " 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (regarding the complexity of doctrines ofjudicial
review of agencies); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 153 (2010).
114 JERRY L. MASHAW &DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 9 25(1990). See
generally Connor Raso, AgencyAvoidance of the Rulemaking Process, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65 (2015)
(comparing scholars' views on addressing agency compliance with statutory rulemaking procedure);
Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or MAost of the Problem?, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 621 (1994) (discussing the role ofjudicial review in the "ossification" of rulemaking,
and proposing ways to ameliorate the process).
"' Rachel Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1130
(2016).
186 Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 33 (1985).
Nortonv. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64,67 (2004).
Lincolnv. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993).
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1. Administrative Settlements
Outside of prosecution of corporations in court, administrative agencies
may pursue civil remedies against companies using internal administrative
proceedings before administrative law judges.'89 The SEC can, for example,
pursue administrative settlements with corporations, and the Dodd-Frank Act
provides the SEC with greater ability to do so. 190 There are not strong guide-
lines regarding when a case must be brought internally versus in court, a topic
that has resulted in a range of criticism and proposals for reforms. 191 Judicial
review of such settlements is normally not permitted or provided for in the
agreements themselves.
Now, when agencies conduct enforcement actions using internal adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings, and a final decision results, findings of fact
receive "substantial evidence" deference, 192 and the final decisions in such
proceedings cannot be reversed on appeal unless they are "arbitrary, capri-
cious, [or] an abuse of discretion."' 193 In general, for such discretionary deci-
sions, review is to be highly deferential and a court is not to "substitute its
judgment" for that of the agency. 194 Yet when administrative matters settle,
there is no final judgment to appeal. The APA itself does not address such situ-
ations, and such settlements have been found not to constitute rulemaking, and
therefore do not call for notice and comment to the public, absent some other
statute. 195 The D.C. Circuit, the only federal court of appeals to address this
question, has concluded that such administrative settlements are tantamount to
189 See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
3(a). The SEC can also order disgorgement of profits. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(e), 78u-2(e); Bennett
Rawicki, The Dodd-Frank Act and SEC Enforcement The Significant Expansions and Remaining
Limitations on the SECs Enforcement Scope andArsenal, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 35, 42 (2013).
190 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(a), (e), 78u-2(e), 3(a); Rawicki, supra note 189.
191 See David Migoya, SEC Wants Federal Court of Appeals to Rethink Ruling That Questions
Administrative Proceedings, DENVER POST (Mar. 14, 2017, 8:14 AM), http://www.denverpost.
com/2017/03/14/sec-denver-appeals-court-judges/ [https://perna.cc/68U9-K7RL] ("Critics have ar-
gued that the SEC conveniently pushes civil cases into its own administrative courts ratherthanfeder-
al circuit courts in part to avoid judicial criticisms about how they prosecute cases, as well as to ensure
favorable outcomes."); Breon Peace et al., The Future of SECAdministrative Proceedings, LAW360
(Jan. 4, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/876875/the-future-of-sec-administrative-
proceedings [https://perma.cc/Y3RS-G7ZN]; see also Bandimere v. United States SEC, 844 F.3d
1168, 1176, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that SEC Administrative Law Judges are "inferior officers
under the Appointments Clause," and one suchjudge unconstitutionally presided over an administra-
tive proceeding).
192 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
193 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
19' Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 44 (1983).
19 5See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718F.2d 1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting) ("The commitment that occurs through a consent decree takes place, however, without
recourse to the public notice requirements of notice and comment rulemaking."); Rossi, supra note 15,
at 1016.
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decisions not to enforce at all, and are, therefore, presumptively unreviewa-
ble. '96 Consistent with the general discussion in this Article, and the discussion
of consent decrees in the next section, I instead view any settlement with en-
forcers as a decision to enforce quite unlike a declination, and therefore pre-
sumptively reviewable. 197 The same deferential, but still meaningful, arbitrari-
ness review should occur for administrative settlements as final orders during
administrative hearings.
2. Regulatory Consent Decrees
Agencies can instead pursue civil remedies in court, and when anticipat-
ing that compliance with the settlement will take some time, can enter a con-
sent decree in which the settlement is judicially-supervised over some period
of time. Judicial review of consent decrees is well established, including the
practice ofjudges examining the public interest. Courts have debated, howev-
er, what the precise scope of that judicial review entails. Supreme Court rul-
ings on such consent decrees describe the role of a court in reviewing a con-
sent decree between a corporation and enforcement officers, as well as be-
tween private and public parties generally. 198 A consent decree is a hybrid,
where it is not a purely private settlement, but also has aspects of a judicial
injunction implicating the equitable power of the court. 199 There are certain
similarities with the inquiry in which a court decides whether or not to approve
a civil consent decree based on whether it is fair, reasonable, and consistent
with the purposes of the laws or regulations, and if injunctive relief is part of
the relief, whether the "public interest would not be disserved." 20 0 Review of
consent decrees is necessarily highly deferential, but a court must consider the
public interest and the sources of underlying law. 201
Courts have recognized their role in substantively reviewing consent
agreements before they approve them. As one court has put it, "when the dis-
trict judge is presented with a proposed consent judgment, he is not merely a
196 Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
197 For an excellent Note developing this argument in detail, see generally Dustin Plotnick, Agen-
cy Settlement Reviewability, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367 (2013).
198 See United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 233 35 & n.8 (1975); United
Statesv. Armour& Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 83 (1971). These descriptions have also appeared in em-
ployment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,
566 70 (1984) (holding a district court's modification to a consent decree in an employment race-
discrimination case could not be imposed upon the City of Memphis without its consent).
199 See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986).
200 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388,391 (2006); see SECv. Randolph, 736 F.2d
525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to
be approved.").
201 See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) ("[A] federal consent de-
cree must.., further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.").
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'rubber stamp. -202 The Ninth Circuit held that "[u]nless a consent decree is
unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved." 203 The D.C. Cir-
cuit explains: "prior to approving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of
the settlement's 'overall fairness to beneficiaries and consistency with the pub-
lic interest.' 20 4 Thus, as the Sixth Circuit has put it, "[f]airness should be
evaluated from the standpoint of signatories and nonparties to the decree. 2 °5
One court has tried to articulate the bounds ofjudicial review of a consent
decree that goes beyond this "rubber stamp approval., 206 The Second Circuit
recently emphasized in Citigroup II: "[t]he primary focus of the inquiry ...
should be on ensuring the consent decree is procedurally proper., 20 7 In fact,
courts have long emphasized that review of a consent decree should examine
the procedural fairness, but also the substantive fairness of a consent decree,
including an independent review carefully examining the public interest.
20 8
The Second Circuit's ruling, holding that a district court abused its discretion
in declining to approve an SEC consent decree, focused on the district court's
findings that the "truth" of certain allegations was not established. 20 9 The Sec-
ond Circuit did emphasize that the court must find a "factual basis" for such a
decree, a requirement that mirrors the requirement of a factual basis for a plea
agreement. 2 10 The Second Circuit also noted: "[s]crutinizing a proposed con-
sent decree for 'adequacy' appears borrowed from the review applied to class
action settlements, and strikes us as particularly inapt in the context of a pro-
posed S.E.C. consent decree.",211 The Second Circuit added:
[b]y the same token, a consent decree does not pose the same con-
cerns regarding adequacy-if there are potential plaintiffs with a
private right of action, those plaintiffs are free to bring their own ac-
tions. Ifthere is no private right of action, then the S.E.C. is the enti-
202 SECv. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1181 (2d Cir. 1989).
23 Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
204 United States v. Trucking Emp'rs, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting United
States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975)) (emphasis added).205 United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
206 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974).
207 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I1), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014).
28 See Turtle Island RestorationNetworkv. Dep't of Commerce, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1017 19
(D. Haw. 2011) (describing procedural and substantive review, and then explaining how "the parties
seek to incorporate their settlement into a court order, and because public interests are at stake, the
[c]ourt must make an independent and searching inquiry, carefully scrutinizing the proposed consent
decree").
209 Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 295.
21
o Id. at 296.
211 Id. at 294.
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ty charged with representing the victims, and is politically liable if it
fails to adequately perform its duties.212
That ruling limits judicial review, but it does recognize that some judicial re-
view can and should be conducted.
Importantly, the Second Circuit emphasized the continued importance of
the public interest. 213 The ruling stated that "the proper standard" asks that the
judge "determine whether the proposed consent decree is fair and reasona-
ble" and whether it safeguards the public interest.2 14 The Second Circuit ex-
plained in Citigroup II: "if the S.E.C. prefers to call upon the power of the
courts in ordering a consent decree and issuing an injunction, then the S.E.C.
must be willing to assure the court that the settlement proposed is fair and rea-
sonable., 215 Although second-guessing the factual basis for the agreement was
not permitted, and the Second Circuit focused on the procedural propriety of
the resulting agreement, Citigroup II is not as narrow as sometimes sup-
posed. 16 The Second Circuit still emphasized that public interest review is still
to be done, including by focusing on the content of the agreement and whether
it is "fair and reasonable. 2  After all, when consent decrees are reviewed, the
public interest must be assessed as part of a court approving ongoing equitable
remedies. 218 The Second Circuit continually emphasized traditional principles
of equity, and on remand asked that the district judge "consider whether the
public interest would be disserved" by entry of the proposed decree.2 19 Alt-
hough the Second Circuit's focus on procedural regulatory was narrow, the
public interest role was still set out, and importantly, it is an outlier decision. A
range of other federal courts all consistently emphasize the role of a reviewing
judge in examining the public interest, including by inquiring into the underly-
ing facts and agency rationales.2 20
212 id.
213 id.
214 id.
215 Id. at 297.
216 See id. at 294.
217 Id. at 297.
218 For a ruling in an FTC consent decree, initially not approving the settlement due to public
interest concerns with the lack of an admission of liability, see FTC v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-
2172, 2012 WL 2178705, at *6 (D.N.J. June 13, 2012). The court later approved a revised consent
decree. FTCv. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 3987610, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2012).
219 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I1), 752 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2014).
220 For an excellent survey of this case law, see Theodore D. Edwards, Note, Of Truth, Pragma-
tism, and Sour Grapes: The Second Circuit's Decision in SECv. Citigroup Global Markets, 65 DUKE
L. J. 1241, 1278 80 (2016); see also Case Comment, Securities Regulation Consent Decrees
Second Circuit Clarifies That a Court 's Review of an SEC Settlement Should Focus on Procedural
Propriety. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d at 285 (2d Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1288, 1294 (2015).
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a. Tunney Act Settlements
By statute, Congress may require that the public interest be considered
before ajudge may approve a settlement. 22 1 Antitrust settlements are an exam-
ple. The Tunney Act, a provision of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
states that a federal judge may enter a proposed antitrust consent decree only if
"in the public interest., 222 The public then has a right to comment on the pro-
posed settlement. The Tunney Act requires that the judge determine whether a
consent decree would not only promote "competition in the relevant market or
markets," but also its impact "upon the public generally. 223 The statute notes
that ajudge, in order to make an informed "public interest determination," may
hold a hearing with testimony from "Government officials or experts," or "ap-
point a special master" or outside experts to provide analysis or evaluations,
and permit appearances by "interested persons or agencies," among the possi-
bilities outlined. 224 The Act was enacted in response to concerns that judges
were rubber-stamping agreements, negotiated in secret, with no opportunity for
third parties to participate. 
225
These procedures provide an important roadmap for legislation designed to
improve the consideration of the public interest in enforcement settlements. The
courts, however, have not adequately given meaning to the Tunney Act provi-
sions. 226 The D.C. Circuit has by its own admission, "narrowly" interpreted the
Tunney Act's provisions. 27 In the antitrust litigation of United States v Mi-
crosoft Corporation, the district court rejected a civil consent decree proposed by
the DOJ. 228 There was much commentary on Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin's
ruling; some accused him of "trying to make himself into the czar of the com-
221 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
222 Id.
223 Id. § 16(e)(1)(B).
224 Id. § 16(f).
225 See generally ITT Dividend, supra note 171, at 603 06 (describing the cases the prompted
enactment of the Tunney Act).
226 See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing, briefly, the "standard for intervention" under the Tunney Act).
227 Id.
228 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1995). InMicrosoft, the DOJ
filed a complaint charging Microsoft with "unlawfully maintaining a monopoly of operating systems
... and unreasonably restraining trade of the same through certain anticompetitive marketing pmctic-
es." Id. at 1451. When the parties proposed a consent decree, Judge Stanley Sporkin denied the decree
as he did not find it was in the public interest, and in doing so reviewed many underlying facts of the
complaint. Id. at 1454 55.
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puter industry," '229 while others applauded him for exposing "an unenforceable
deal that let the government save face while letting Microsoft off the hook.,
230
The D.C. Circuit reversed, and took the unusual step of reassigning the
case to another judge, stating that the "public interest" standard did not "em-
power[ ]" the judge to reject a consent decree "merely because he believed
other remedies were preferable.",231 In one respect, the ruling was similar to
that in Citigroup II, where the real focus was on considering matters extrinsic
to the agreement.232 The D.C. Circuit held that the "court was barred from
reaching beyond the complaint to examine practices the government did not
challenge." 233 The D.C. Circuit went even further in holding that a judge may
only reject an agreement "that, on its face and even after government explana-
tion, appears to make a mockery ofjudicial power," or if any of the terms ap-
pear ambiguous, if the enforcement mechanism is inadequate, and finally, if
third parties will be positively injured. 234 That interpretation, while permitting
review in several circumstances, remains highly constrained-it sought to re-
write the Tunney Act, somehow making the standard for review under a statute
that specifically states that the public interest must be examined in a narrower
fashion than under consent decree approval rules more generally. 235 Although
the D.C. Circuit was right to conclude "the Tunney Act cannot be interpreted
as an authorization for a districtjudge to assume the role of Attorney General,"
the court should have given the public interest far more scope, in line with
what Congress intended and in line with standard rules regarding approval of
consent decrees.236 The court could have interpreted the public interest stand-
ard set out in the statute, rather than replacing it with its own language limiting
the reversal authority of a judge to the situations set out. To be sure, only the
third "mockery of judicial power" situation is a highly constrained one; the
"inadequate" enforcement mechanism and the other situations identified do
leave room to provide for the public interest. 237 An overreaching decision by a
district judge, in a high profile case, led to an overly constrictive appellate in-
229 Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust ConsentDecrees, and the Needfor a
Proper Scope ofJudicialReview, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1(1996) (Judge Sporkin's Computer Virus,
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 20, 1995, at A8).
230 David Einstein, The Judge Who Rejected Microsoft, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 16, 1995, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/The-Judge-Who-Rejected-Microsoft-Stanley-3044564.php
[https://penna.cc/XWS9-R7AF]. For a detailed and insightful discussion, see Antritrust ConsentDe-
crees, supra note 229, at 1.
211 Microsoft, 56 F.3d. at 1460.
232 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I1), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014).
211 Microsoft, 56 F.3d. at 1460.
234 Id. at 1462.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 1460, 1462.
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terpretation of the entire public interest standard in the Tunney Act. 238 The re-
sult may have been continued over-use of consent decrees, and the concern
that the government seeks to regulate through the use of detailed terms in
agreements, without meaningful judicial review. 239 That said, other courts have
adopted a different approach; the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, for example,
permits broader judicial review under the Tunney Act.24 °
The Tunney Act, intended to introduce broader public interest considera-
tions in approval of antitrust consent decrees, seemingly uncontroversially
permits a range of procedural steps prior to their entry, including hearings with
participation by the public and agencies and monitoring. 241 Also troubling on
the procedural side, however, is that some courts have narrowly interpreted the
ability of private parties to intervene to represent the public interest in Tunney
Act proceedings, stating that they may do so only after making "some strong
showing that the government is not vigorously and faithfully representing the
public interest.',
242
What was the rationale for narrowly interpreting a statute, which adopted
clear language intended to provide greater judicial review of antitrust settle-
ments? 243 The D.C. Circuit later explained that this was due in "part because of
the constitutional questions that would be raised if courts were to subject the
government's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion to non-deferential re-. ,244 souds a .m
view. 2 nls sounds like a criminal analogy: does the same prosecutorial dis-
cretion apply in a civil enforcement case entered to accomplish regulatory ob-
jectives? And why does the Constitution permit only "deferential review" of
negotiated settlements between the government and corporations? After all, in
238 See Anderson: Antitrust ConsentDecrees, supra note 229, at 6 ("[W]hile Judge Sporkin clear-
ly exceeded the proper scope of judicial review, the court of appeals has formulated an excessively
narrow standard ofjudicial review."); id. at 34 ("[I]n its haste and zeal to reverse Judge Sporkin, the
court of appeals created bad law, both practically and legally.").
239 See, e.g., id. at 6; Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory ConsentDecree,
ANTITRUST, Fall 1995, at 4 ("Indeed, consent decrees have so enriched-or supplanted-case law that
the advice antitrust lawyers give their clients frequently may be entirely divorced from recent case law
authority.").240 See United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 63 (9th Cir. 1988) (construing broadly the
court's ability to review matters both within and beyond the complaint at bar).
241 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
242 Mass. Sch. of Law, 118 F.3d at 783 (internal citations omitted); United States v. LTV, 746
F.2d 51, 54 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 573 F.2d 1, 2 (6th
Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976)
(requiring the government's "bad faith or malfeasance" to warrant judicial intervention) (internal
quotation marks and modification omitted).
14'Forthe argument that judicial review should be more searching, pre-Mi crosoft, see Note, The
Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of
1974, 82 MICH. L. REV. 153 (1983).
244 Mass.Sch.o aw, 118 F.3d at 783; see Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
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any case involving a preliminary injunction or consent decree, as noted, the
public interest is a factor thatjudges must consider. Surely, such consideration
of the public interest does not implicate a constitutional question. Nor did the
D.C. Circuit cite to any body of law or source for its narrower interpretation of
the statutory language. It is not as if the public interest is something constitu-
tionally committed to the Executive Branch. Moreover, Congress can and has
regulated judicial review of a range of criminal and civil settlements. And the
Supreme Court has, if anything, empowered district judges to modify consent
decrees in light of changed circumstances, a different setting than the initial
approval of a decree, but one which similarly highlights the equitable power of
a judge. 45
A compromise approach adopted shortly after the Tunney Act's enactment
by a federal district court permitted constrained public interest review:
It is not the court's duty to determine whether this is the best possi-
ble settlement that could have been obtained if, say, the government
had bargained a little harder. The court is not settling the case. It is
determining whether the settlement achieved is within the reaches of
the public interest.
2 46
The government may have "primacy" over charging and enforcement matters,
but if it seeks judicial review and approval of a settlement, there is no constitu-
tional reason why the courts should not assure that the settlement comports
with the public interest. That is particularly the case where agencies decide to
avoid adjudication of civil enforcement actions by settling them with consent
decrees, which, for example, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission increasingly do.247 Nor did the public interest standard, as applied
by the federal courts, raise any problems in its workability prior to the D.C.
Circuit's Microsoft opinion.24 8
In response to the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft opinion, Congress amended
the Tunney Act in 2004, to emphasize that a courts review of antitrust consent
decrees should not be overly narrow and courts "shall" (rather than "may" in
the prior version) consider factors in their review. 249 The Congressional find-
ings emphasized that the D.C. Circuit's "mockery of the judicial function"
245 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (remanding,
instead of automatically reinstating a district court decision, so the district court could "decide, in
accordance with this opinion, whether the Board [of Education] made a sufficient showing of constitu-
tional compliance" to warrant terminating an injunction).
141 United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975).247 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Settlements: The Culture of Consent, in 1
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE 177, 180 (Nicolas Charbit et al. eds., 2012).
14' Anderson: Antitrust Consent Decrees, supra note 229, at 38 3 9.
149 150 CONG. REc. S3,615 16 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Senator Kohl).
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standard was far too narrow a view of the discretion of district judges.250 This
change by Congress indicates that Congress is concerned about the overall
ability of parties to enter into such agreements, using the judiciary as little
more than a rubber stamp on the conditions that they set, with little to no op-
portunity for review to consider the public interest.
b. Public Participation in Consent Decrees
Where the fairness and reasonableness of a consent decree may require
input by non-parties, public participation and defined procedures are required
for approval of a range of civil agreements that raise issues of public im-
portance, and not just in the antitrust context. For settlements of enforcement
actions by agencies, several federal agencies must permit notice and comment
from the public before they enter into consent decrees regarding certain federal
statutes. 251 Further, in civil actions filed by agencies, third parties potentially
affected by a consent decree may participate in a fairness hearing before court
approval 52 Courts have been more open to requirements of public or third-
party participation, as opposed to substantive review of the agreements. For
example, in 2003 in Swiftv. United States, the D.C. Circuit interpreted aprovi-
sion of the False Claims Act ("FCA") providing a qui tam relator's right to a
hearing (set out in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)), as permitting the hearing, but
notjudicial review of a decision by the government to dismiss an FCA case.253
And yet, courts have not been wholly consistent in their focus on proce-
dure over substance. Compare the approach towards judicial review of civil
rights settlements, which have received quite intrusive judicial review under
demanding standards that focus on the substance of settlement terms. 254 If the
D.C. Circuit was right that it raised a constitutional question to apply the Tun-
ney Act to consider the public interest in an antitrust settlement, then there
should be a far greater constitutional concern with statutes such as the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, which states that injunctive relief in prison suits should
251 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108 237,
§ 221(a)(1)(B), 118 Stat. 661, 668.
251 See, e.g., Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)
(2012); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(3)(B) (2012); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(d)(2); 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2006) (FTC consent orders); Supplement Rules Governing Public
Notice and Comment in Proceedings Under Sections 309(g) and 311 (b)(6)(B)(ii) of the Clean Water
Act and section 1423(c) of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 40 C.F.R. § 22.45(b) (2017) (detailing Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency public notice requirements).
252 See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
253 Swift, 318 F.3d at 250, 254.
254 Lloyd C. Anderson Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 726 [hereinafter Anderson: StructuralReform Litigation]; Timothy Stoltzfus
Jost, From Swift to Stotts andBeyond: Modification of njunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 1101, 1103, 1129 (1986); Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of ConsentDe-
crees in CivilRights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 584 86.
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be "narrowly drawn" and the "least intrusive" remedy for the violation of fed-
eral rights in question.255
Some of those suits involving consent decrees are brought by government
enforcers while others are brought by private litigants. Private consent decrees,
like public consent decrees, involve elements of contract, in that parties have
agreed to settle a case. But they also invoke the ongoing equitable powers of
the court, and similarly require judicial review and approval. Moreover, be-
cause private consent decrees require ongoing compliance, they typically re-
quire ongoing reporting to the parties and to the court, or through a monitor or
256a special master. The court will resolve disputes that arise under the consent
decree by interpreting its terms and issuing injunctions to achieve compli-
ance. 257
When legislation requires that the substantive terms of private settlements
be subject to judicial review, courts take that legislation seriously and conduct
the required review. Under the FRCP, a class action settlement must be found
"fair, reasonable and adequate" before it is given final approval.2 58 In that con-
text, the rule reflects due process concerns with the effects of a settlement on
non-participating class members, including the need to avoid potential intra-
class conflicts, preferential treatment of certain class members over others, or
inadequate representation. Courts have elaborated on further considerations
regarding the complexity of the case, such as the participation of government
litigants and the reaction of class members.2 59 The fairness concerns in the
context of a criminal prosecution are different because adequacy of representa-
tion is not applicable, though an analogous concern-the interests of victims-
may be implicated. A court must also approve shareholder derivative suit set-
tlements under standards that require careful judicial review. 260 Courts have
not shied away from carefully scrutinizing such settlements prior to approval.
Moreover, some settlements involve parallel negotiation and settlement of
multiple types of these agreements, including actions by civil, criminal, and
private litigants. Not all of these agreements overlap in their requirements for
public participation.
255 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012).
15' Anderson: StructuralReform Litigation, supra note 254, at 731 34.
257 Id. at 738 39.
151 FED. R. C1v. P. 23(e)(2).
259 See, e.g., Hanlonv. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding a district
court mustbalance many factors, including"the presence ofagovernmental participant; and the reac-
tion of the class members to the proposed settlement").260 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS
A. Equity and the Public Interest
Corporate settlements involve elements of contract and the law of equita-
ble judgments. There is a tension reflected in the cases discussed in the last
Part between the desire to allow parties to settle their cases through a contract
with negotiated terms, the power of an enforcer to decide whether and how to
pursue adjudication, 261 and the equitable power of a court over ajudgment that
it is being called on to potentially enforce and interpret going forward. 62 The
concern for the public interest can be lost in settlements between enforcing
entities and corporations if not directly preserved in judicial review.
What is the scope of the countervailing judicial review power? As the Su-
preme Court has put it: "the essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power...
to do equity, particularly when an important public interest is involved. 263 Re-
latedly, the longstanding and traditional standards for injunctive relief include
four factors. As the Supreme Court summarized the standard in its ruling in
eBay, Inc. v MercExchange in 2006:
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor
test before a court may grant such relief A plaintiff must demon-
strate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to com-
pensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warrant-
ed; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a per-
manent injunction.264
The public interest is a longstanding element in a federal judge's review of
injunctive relief as well as consent decrees. 65 Parties cannot simply contractinto injunctive relief; the judge still examines the public interest. 266 To be sure,
261 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824.
262 See Frew, 540 U.S. at 437 ("Consent decrees entered in federal court mustbe directed to pro-
tecting federal interests."); Lawyerv. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 579 n.6 (1997) ("[Ilt is the par-
ties' agreement that serves as the source of the court's authority to enter any [consent] judgment at
all.") (quoting Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 552
(1986)); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (describing consent decrees as
"an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, ajudicial
decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees").
... Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,217 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
264 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
265 See Virginian Ry. Co.v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
266 Indeed, there is a difficult constitutional question whether Congress can require the judge to
enter an injunctive remedy for a violation of federal law, even if the parties do not seek it. For an
insightful discussion of this question, see Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest,
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some agreements do not implicate the rights of third parties or the public. But
if the public is implicated, then the courts have a "heightened responsibil-
• ,,267
ity, and a "larger role," to be "satisfied of the fairness of the settlement., 268
The equitable power protects both sides of a dispute and the public inter-
est may also counsel modification of a settlement. Judges must ensure that an
agreement is terminated when its goals have been accomplished, and, if the
agreement's public interest goal still remains unfulfilled, judges must also en-
sure the agreement be made more rigorous to accomplish those goals. Thus,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]he federal court must exercise its
equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been at-
tained," the consent decree is ended, while if the State, in a decree involving a
government actor, "establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should
make the necessary changes; where it has not done so, however, the decree
should be enforced according to its terms. 269
As described in the last Part, in troubling cases in different contexts-
ranging from SEC settlements to the Tunney Act, and to DPAs-courts have
stepped away from public interest review to narrow the authority of district
judges. 270 Nevertheless, those courts, I have argued, misinterpreted governing
legal standards narrowed the ability of a trial judge to assess the public interest
before entering a decree or approving a settlement.27' What would a more pub-
lic interest-oriented approach look like?
First, judges should permit public participation where appropriate, and
certainly when required, as in criminal matters (both regarding plea agree-
ments and DPAs as required by federal statutes), and when consent decrees call
for it. The information provided by the public, or interest groups, or victims,
can inform substantive review of the corporate agreement. As one scholar has
put it: "In all cases, the courts must understand the prospective decree well
enough to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility for compliance.,
272
Second, the public interest should be routinely considered, but informed
by a range of factors. The Supreme Court has stated: "[e]quity eschews me-
chanical rules; it depends on flexibility., 273 That said, factors can inform this
flexible analysis. Across a range of legal and regulatory contexts, common
problems are emerging when constructing and reviewing complex corporate
settlements. I have proposed a set of functional factors that can usefully break
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382,401 03 (1983) (noting also that "courts' ability to question the substan-
tiality of a legal wrong should be limited").
217 United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1990).268 Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986).
219 Hawkins, 540 U.S. at 442.
270 See supra notes 221 250 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 221 250 and accompanying text.
272 Shreve, supra note 266, at 405.
273 Holmbergv. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
[Vol. 58:1483
The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements
out separate considerations when reviewing such settlements, each of which
broadly relates to the public interest in obtaining a settlement that furthers un-
derlying legal or regulatory enforcement goals. These factors expand on those
discussed by Judge Sullivan in his ruling in United States v. Saena Tech
Corp.2 74 They set out practical problems and mechanisms that corporate set-
tlements typically use. Each of these factors is explored in depth in the sections
that follow; they are not an exclusive list, however, and additional factors may
impact the public interest.
Third, the court should carefully consider agency explanations and evi-
dence, concerning the agency's policy and the individual reasons for settling a
case in a particular manner. Each of those reasons should receive careful defer-
ence, since the agency has regulatory expertise, although the judge still must
have sufficient information to assess the claims of the enforcing agency.
B. Public Interest Factors
1. Adequacy of Financial Penalties
Agreements that do not impose any fines or other penalties, or that im-
pose fines and penalties that do not comport with the purposes of the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines or statutory fines provisions, may deserve partic-
ular scrutiny. Most DPAs do not include a Sentencing Guidelines calculation or
other explanation of the origin of any fine amount or other penalty. 275 Many
such criminal agreements provide for no criminal fine at all, sometimes with-
out explanation.27 6 Sometimes the company is understandably given credit for
payments to regulators or other prosecutors.27 7 In some cases, the company
may be defunct or unable to pay. Without explanation, however, it is difficult
to evaluate whether the amounts of penalties are reasonable or fair. The same
concerns can anse in the context of forfeiture, restitution, and other types of
payments made in corporate settlement agreements of various types.
Judges may sometimes consider the amount of the fine in their decision to
approve a settlement, but it may not be enough alone to uphold the court's re-
jection of an agreement. In 2010 in SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp., Federal
Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York approved a settlement
274 See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2015); supra notes
127 129 and accompanying text.
275 See GARRETr: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 149 50 (describing how 12 percent, or 30 of
255 deferred prosecution agreements entered from 2001 2012, involved a sentencing guidelines cal-
culation, and when it was provided, almost without exception, it was at or below the bottom of the
guidelines range, even for cases involving large public companies).
171 Id. at 69, 149 50 (noting that almost half of deferred prosecution agreements from 2001 2012
provided for no fine, and prosecutors provided no explanation for not doing so except in a few cases
involving firms unable to pay a fine).
277 See id. at 68 70.
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after raising concerns regarding the size of the fine, noting that a $150 million
fine was "paltry" in the context of a multi-billion dollar merger, and where its
cost would be borne by shareholders and not responsible actors. 278 The judge
approved the settlement, but found that these flaws raised public interest con-279
cerns. In CitigroupI, however, the judge rejected the agreement, focusing on
the failure to require the bank to admit liability, but also noting that the fine
was "pocket change" for a bank so large, and it was far smaller than a fine in a
similar case involving Goldman Sachs during the same time period . 8 When
the Second Circuit reversed, the panel did not address the concerns raised in
the district court regarding the small size of the fine. 281 Although judges have
noted the adequacy of a fine, this alone may not be enough to justify ajudge's
rejection of an agreement and uphold that judge's decision on appeal.
2. Compliance
Agreements that do not impose compliance terms or supervision of com-
pliance may raise accountability concerns. As discussed, judges have rejected
plea agreements with corporations that do not impose supervised probation in
order to ensure compliance.282 Also of concern are agreements that do require
that a company make changes to its policies and compliance program without
clearly explaining what changes are required. If the sought after good conduct
is not spelled out in the DPA, it is unclear how the government will determine
whether the company has demonstrated its good conduct. When judges are
tasked with overseeing corporate agreements that call for ongoing supervision
of compliance, judges understandably should insist that the public interest re-
quires ongoing information about compliance and probation, monitoring, or
other mechanisms to ensure that compliance is adequately assessed. Indeed,
many agreements do not require that compliance be regularly audited or as-
sessed, which the Sentencing Guidelines view as crucial, along with internal
whistleblowing or reporting systems. 28 3 The Sentencing Guidelines describe in
some detail what minimally effective compliance may require, and taking into
account the size of the organization.284 Accomplishing improvements to com-
pliance is an important goal of corporate prosecution, but only if that compli-
278 SECv. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2010).
279BankofAm., No. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *6; see also SECv. Vitesse Semi-
conductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
280 SECv. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328,334 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
rev 'd and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
281 See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I1), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
282 See GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 153 54.
283 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B 1.1 (b) (Nov. 2016) [hereinafter
2016 SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
114 Id. § 8B2.1 & Commentary.
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ance is not "cosmetic," and is carefully-assessed and audited to ensure its ef-
fectiveness. Cases that involve foreign companies can also potentially raise
questions regarding the intersection of compliance with U.S. laws and regula-
tions and foreign corporate governance rules. Some DPAs have even called for
the appointment of foreign corporate monitors to help assure that governance
changes are suitable to the United States as well as the foreign country's laws,
regulations, and business norms.22 8 5 These monitors further keep corporations
accountable to continue to comply with the conditions of the agreement.
3. Monitoring
The role of an independent monitor has become regarded as a powerful tool
to ensure compliance and promote the public interest in corporate settlements
because it holds corporations accountable for longer periods of time. For exam-
ple, the Antitrust Division has emphasized importance of "effective compliance
programs," and that the Division will "reserve the right to insist on probation,
including the use of monitors, if doing so is necessary to ensure an effective
compliance program and to prevent recidivism. 28 6 The stated goal is for the
corporation to benefit from "expertise in the area of corporate compliance from
an independent third party."287 The SEC has more often appointed monitors in
securities fraud actions and more recently, in FCPA actions.288 In a wide range of
areas, the DOJ has led the way in establishing independent monitoring to reform
institutions, and it typically has insisted that the reports of such monitors be
made public. 289 For years, the quarterly reports of the independent monitor of the
Los Angeles Police Department have been made public, for example.2 90 It is
standard for reports of policing monitorships established through DOJ consent
285 See Garrett: Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 3, at 1838, 1852 53, 1856.
286 Bill Baer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Remarks as Prepared for the Georgetown University Law
Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes 8 (Sept. 10, 2014)
(on file with author).
287 Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., forHeads of Dep't Compo-
nents & U.S. Att'ys, 1 2 (Mar. 7, 2008) (on file with author).
... F. Joseph Warin et al., Somebody 's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can
WorkBetter, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321,322 (20 11); O'Hare, supra note 13, at 89-90; Mary Jo White,
Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech Before the NYC Bar Association's Third Annual White Collar
Crime Institute: Three Key Pressure Points in the Current Regulatory Environment (May 19, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch05 1914mjw.html [https://perna.cc/7HX5-4GSZ] (de-
scribing increased SEC use of monitors).
2 8 9 See, e.g., JAMES D. GINGER, MONITOR'S FIRSTREPORT: COMPLIANCE LEVELS OF THE ALBU-
QUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE WITH REQUIREMENTS OF THE
COURT-APPROVED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2015), http://documents.cabq.gov/police/reports/
department-of-justice/independent-monitors-first-report.pdf [https://perna.cc/8SHK-6KTM].290 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE QUARTER ENDING DECEMBER 31,
2008, OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR FOR THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T (2009), http://assets.lapdonline.
org/assets/pdf/LAPD Q30 Final Report 02-17-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X4T-XE6J].
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decrees to be made public. 291 Many of these reports contain extremely detailed
findings concerning compliance by the police departments subject to the de-
crees. 292 These findings can further ensure that the parties to the agreement re-
main accountable to their promises, as well as assist judges in ascertaining
whether or not a consent decree is contrary to the public interest.
In criminal cases, a similar role can be observed in court ordered proba-
tion where, pursuant to special conditions, federal courts have long appointed
special masters or corporate monitors. 293 Over two-thirds of convicted corpora-
294tions are put on probation. According to Sentencing Guidelines, corporations
shall be put on probation if they lack an effective compliance program and
have more than fifty employees or were otherwise required to have such a
compliance program.295 In addition, such probation can be more actively moni-
tored if "special conditions" are imposed to ensure "changes are made within
the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct., 296 Corpo-
rate probation is court-supervised and ajudge can make information about the
process public and available on the docket.
Yet, the use of monitors is highly uneven, particularly in criminal prose-
cutions, where monitors are typically not appointed and when they are, their
work has remained almost entirely non-public. 297 Only one-quarter of deferred
and non-prosecution agreements since 2001 call for the appointment of a cor-
porate or independent monitor to supervise compliance, which can provide
outside assurance that compliance has been improved. 298 Absent judicial ap-
proval, there may be concerns with the selection process for the monitor posi-
tion and the monitor's neutrality. Concerns have also been raised about the
terms of retention of monitors, including their pay. Some agreements require
creation of an internal Chief Compliance Officer or other similar position to
ensure the compliance function is strengthened within the company. There is a
growing field of scholarship critically examining the widespread role of these
monitors in criminal prosecutions. 299 Periodic reporting to a court may provide
291 See, e.g., GINGER, supra note 289.
292 See id.
293 See 2016 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 283, § 8D1.1.
294 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
table 54 (2012), https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2012 [https://penna.
cc/7923-EA2S].
295 2016 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 283, § 8D1. 1(a)(3).
296Id. § 8D2.5(a)(6).
297 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 147 71.
298 Id. at 190 92.
299 See, e.g., Vikramaditya Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor?, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 226,238 41,244 (An-
thony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Warin et al., supra note 288, at 322 & n.2; Christie
Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L.
679, 732 34 (2009) (discussing the difficulties inherent inbeing a corporate monitor).
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further assurance that compliance is being effectively improved. Some have
recommended that monitors could be selected in a fairer or more impartial
manner; they have asked whether monitors effectively supervise and improve
compliance; and whether their role is adequately defined. Scholars have asked
why monitors are often not appointed in DPAs, if prosecutors are concerned
that compliance programs be effective.
30 0
Each of these concerns could be addressed through a more robust consid-
eration of the public interest, beginning with the role of federal judges in su-
pervising the approval and implementation of corporate settlements. Equitable
standards can inform whether monitors are to be appointed and the scope of
their duties.30 ' Judges should also ask whether they should approve an agree-
ment that does not call for compliance to be independently monitored. Judge
Gleeson cited to his "supervisory power" when calling for the monitor to re-
port to the court.3 °2 Here, however, Judge Gleeson could have more broadly
relied on equitable authority; then again, given the tenor of the Second Cir-
cuit's reversal on appeal, and its ruling in the Citicorp case, one wonders
whether the panel would have been amenable to arguments more firmly
grounded in the public interest. Judges already exercise such authority in a
range of settings, however, when they assess the public interest in civil consent
decree approvals, or decide whether to impose special conditions of corporate
probation. But they have tended not to do so in other settings, such as with
DPAs. Regulators, or some independent third party monitor, should thus assess
or monitor corporate compliance in order to assure that injunctive conditions
of a settlement are effectively satisfied and in accord with the public interest.
Moreover, the reports of monitors should be made public, so affected par-
ties have enough information to know whether to intervene if compliance is
lacking. Special master reports in consent decrees can be quite detailed and
they are typically made public. In some cases, reports and hearings involving
testimony of a special master discussing compliance of a company on corpo-
rate probation are part of the federal docket. 30 3 Some corporations have them-
selves made public the reports of independent monitors during probation.30 4
... See GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 190 92.
301 For a proposal along those lines, see generally O'Hare, supra note 13, at 89.
302 United Statesv. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at * 1
(ED.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev 'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017).
0 For example, a series of hearings are available in the case of United States v. lonia Manage-
ment. See 07-134 USA v. Ionia Management S.A. et al, U.S. GOv'T PUBL'G OFFICE, https://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCOURTS-ctd-3_07-cr-00 134/USCOURTS-ctd-3 07-cr-00134-17 [https://
perma.cc/4F4H-WN38]; see, e.g., Special Master's Second Report, United States v. lonia Mgmt. S.A.
(D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2009) (No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA)). Special Master's Fifth Report, United States v.
Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 2009 WL 3074727 (D. Ct. Conn. Jan. 12, 2011) (No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA)).
304 See Environmental Compliance Plans, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.duke-energy.com/our-
company/environment/compliance-and-reporting/environmental-compliance-plans [https://penna.cc/
8VEA-K4F2].
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The outlier situation is in cases settled out of court, particularly criminal DPAs,
in which monitors reports have almost never been made public.3 °5 In these in-
stances, affected parties may not be able to seek intervention if the corporation
is not compliant.
The entire concept of a corporate monitor is to retain a person or entity
that is independent: not an agent of the corporation or of the prosecutor, but
rather an entity serving in the public interest. This independent party provides
information to the parties as well as the judge, and in my view, it should also
inform the public. The reports by that monitor, properly redacted, should in-
form the judge's supervision of a case, whether it is a civil or criminal judg-
ment or settlement. Among the public, other corporations can benefit from best
practices and success stories described in monitor reports, as well as from the
difficulties monitors encounter. Thus, despite the Second Circuit ruling in
HSBC IV, I hope the practice changes and that prosecutors and corporations
make it a policy to routinely make portions of these monitors reports public.
Such lessons may ultimately help prevent corporate violations in the first in-
stance, which, in my view, serves perhaps the largest public interest of all.
4. Cooperation with Law Enforcement
Settlement agreements with corporations can include agreements of the
corporation to cooperate with law enforcement after investigations have con-
cluded. These also take into account a corporation's cooperation before a set-
tlement was reached. One common feature of corporate settlements is agree-
ment by the company to cooperate in any pending investigations of miscon-
duct. Some settlements might not involve the need for any such further coop-
eration. Any investigations of individuals, such as criminal investigations, may
have been declined or completed. If further investigations are anticipated,
however, it is highly problematic from a public interest perspective if agree-
ments do not require cooperation, or where a company that did not fully coop-
erate at times prior to settlement still receives leniency. This is problematic
because it does not incentivize cooperation by the corporations prior to the set-
tlement stage and hinders the outcome of investigations, and, thus, the ability
of the investigatory agency to build its case.
Self-reporting by a company deserves particular credit, where the conduct
might not otherwise have come to the attention of law enforcement.3 °6 Initial
non-cooperation, in contrast, may not warrant the same treatment. An agree-
ment that provides some sort of release from prosecution of responsible indi-
305 See GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 177 (noting that few such reports have been
made public).306 See, e.g., 2016 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 283, § 8C2.5(g) (instructing prosecutors
to "subtract ... points" for "[s]elf-reporting,[c]ooperation, and [aicceptance of [riesponsibility").
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viduals who might otherwise have been prosecuted may raise concerns. Alt-
hough courts have, in rare cases, with examples noted, rejected organizational
plea agreements expressing concern with the non-prosecution of individuals,
the authority to consider non-cooperation regarding other prosecutions as a
factor is less than entirely clear. Agreements commonly provide for the full
cooperation of the company with all pending investigations by regulators and
prosecutors. Terms requiring waiver of work product or attorney client privi-
307lege have raised judicial concerns in past cases.
5. Substantive Law and Unrelated Terms
The public interest in a corporate settlement is fundamentally defined by
the underlying sources of substantive law that give rise to the offense. Settle-
ments should not be entered that contradict the goals of those sources of sub-
stantive law. For example, I have suggested that imposing substantial, unrelat-
ed obligations on an organization, which are not called for by governing stat-
utes or sentencing guidelines, would call for judicial review. In the context of
criminal DPAs, terms such as those requiring a charitable contribution unrelat-
ed to remedying the harm caused by the crime, might also deserve judicial in-
tervention. Those terms are now contrary to the DOJ's own guidelines and, so,
a party would be unlikely to include them in a criminal prosecution agree-
3081ment. If obligations wholly unrelated to the agreement are included, judicial
intervention should block them. Such judicial review does not contravene sep-
aration of powers, but rather aims to prevent enforcers from themselves step-
ping outside the bounds defined by substantive law.
6. Collateral Consequences
In corporate prosecutions and settlements, there are often unintended con-
sequences that accompany the intended penalty to the corporation. For some
companies, and in some regulated industries, a conviction could result in sus-
pension or debarment that would have unduly severe consequences for a com-
309pany. If a company was debarred from doing work critical to its business,
117 See Garrett: Corporate Confessions, supra note 51 (discussing controversy and policy changes
concerning both types of privilege).3 8 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-16.325 (May 2008) (stating that
such agreements should not include terms requiring payments to a person or organization "that is not a
victim of the criminal activity or is not providing services to redress the harm caused by the defend-
ant's criminal conduct").
'09 Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J.
411, 426 (2007) ("A criminal indictment can have devastating consequences for a corporation and
risks the market imposing what is in effect a corporate death penalty."); Edward B. Diskant, Note,
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through
Comparative CriminalProcedure, 118 YALEL.J. 126, 128 29 (2008) ("[Ilt is commonwisdom with-
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employees and shareholders who did not participate in the wrongdoing could
be seriously harmed. The public might be harmed if the company provides an
important product or service to the public or to the government. Fairness may
sometimes counsel a settlement that avoids such collateral consequences, and
such consequences are understandably a factor that prosecutors take great care
to consider. Sometimes suspension or debarment from government contracting
might be a consequence of a violation or a conviction. In addition, a deferred
prosecution, although not a judgment, may itself result in legal and collateral
consequences, providing still additional reasons for a judge to supervise and
approve the agreement.310
That said, collateral consequences can often be avoided through negotia-
tions with regulators. Further, concerns that public companies would be de-
stroyed by an indictment, much less a conviction, have turned out to be highly
overstated. Many public companies have been convicted in recent years with-
out such consequences .311 Thus, judges should carefully assess any claims that
potential collateral consequences demand more lenient treatment.
A different use of equitable power by the judge to avoid undue collateral
consequences can involve the use of a stay of civil proceedings, pending reso-
lution of criminal proceedings. Parallel proceedings are common and encour-
aged by government policy, 3 12 and they are permitted where enforcers have
overlapping authority.313 Equitable remedies, however, can ensure that discov-
ery from a criminal case can be used in a civil case, but also that criminal pro-
cedure protections are not eroded through use of evidence in a civil case,
in the business community that a conviction amounts to a potentially lethal blow for a corporation.
one from which the corporation may not recover even if it is actually innocent ... ").
310 See, e.g., Harmonv. Teamsters, Chaffeurs & Helpers Local Union 371, 832 F.2d 976, 980 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("We conclude that 'conviction' within the meaning of section 504 includes punishment
underthe deferred-judgment procedure."); McKinney v. Moore, No. 04 Civ. 07926(RCC), 2007 WL
1149253, at *3, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2007) ("This deferred prosecution agreement, which contains
several remedial and punitive provisions, renders it well within the broad meaning and reading of
'conviction."').
"11 See generally Gabriel Markoff, ArthurAndersen and the Myth of the Corporate Penalty: Cor-
porate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797 (2013) (positing
that the "corporate deathpenalty" is a myth, and DPAs should be the exception instead of the norm in
corporate criminal prosecutions).
312 See GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also U.S. DEP'TOF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-12.000 (Feb. 2013) ("Coordination of Parallel Criminal,
Civil, Regulatory, and Administrative Proceedings") [hereinafter ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: 2013].
313 SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (enbanc) ("The civil and regula-
tory laws of the United States frequently overlap with the criminal laws, creating the possibility of
parallel civil and criminal proceedings, either successive or simultaneous. In the absence of substantial
prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, such parallel proceedings are unobjectionable under our
jurisprudence.").
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where the same protections and standards of proof do not apply.314 Doing so
can also reduce the burden on the judicial system of managing parallel litiga-
tion regarding the same corporate conduct.
7. The Public and Victims
When a settlement impacts third parties, there is much broader agreement
among the legal community that a judge should more carefully review its
terms.315 Process values matter in such circumstances, and not just the proce-
dural fairness to the defendant, but procedural fairness to members of the pub-
lic, victims, or third parties who may have an opportunity to intervene and par-
ticipate. Judges should be attentive to the procedural and substantive rights of
the public in such settlements, and in some areas of law, those rights can be
fairly robust. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines prioritizes payment
of restitution to victims over fines paid to the government.316 Some DPAs pro-
vide for restitution to victims, but there is the concern that victims do not par-
ticipate as they would in a plea proceeding, and cannot raise questions relevant
to their interests as well as the public interest. 317 Whether restitution would be
appropriate or participation by victims is appropriate could be a factor to con-
sider. Recently, Congress spoke on the issue of DPAs by further buttressing the
role ofjudicial supervision and approval of DPAs, in line with the concerns set
out in this Article. 318 In the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015,
Congress included a provision that victims have a statutory right to be notified
ofDPAs.319 The CVRA was amended to establish that each "crime victim" has
"[t]he right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred
prosecution agreement," thus facilitating their "right to full and timely restitu-
tion as provided in law," providing, in addition, for appellate review of any
denial of restitution. 320 Those provisions assure that when a DPA is filed in
court, it cannot be approved without the involvement of relevant victims.
321
Those provisions highlight how approval and supervision of DPAs, or, for
that matter, potentially any type of settlement between a corporation and the
government, implicates judicial review, public interests, and specifically victim
314 For a wonderful Note exploring these issues and recommending the use of equitable power to
stay parallel civil proceedings, see generally Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel
Civil and CriminalActions, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1985).
315 For an excellent discussion of the importance of adequacy of consideration of third party in-
terests in enforcement decrees, see generally W. Hamilton Jordan, Calibrating Judicial Scrutiny of
Agency Enforcement Decrees, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 89 (2015).
316 2016 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 283, § 8B 1.1.
317 For a discussion of these challenges, see GARRETr: Too BIGTO JAIL, supra note 1, at 117-46.
"' 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (2012 & Supp. III 2015).
319 Id.
320 Id. § 3771(a).
321 See id.
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rights. 322 Similarly, provisions could be enacted in a range of civil contexts as
well; the Tunney Act and certain other statutes contain such provisions, but it
could be a broader principle that any settlement with a corporation, civil or
criminal, can only be approved with notice and participation of relevant vic-
tims. These provisions protect the victims, as well as bolster the role of the
public interest in these corporate settlements.
8. Government Interests
The goals of prosecutors or regulatory enforcers and the underlying sub-
stantive goals of regulatory schemes, where the crime is a provision incorpo-
rated into such a scheme, are highly relevant to evaluating the fairness and rea-
sonableness of a corporate agreement. These are considered the government's
interests. None of this discussion has been to suggest that judges should not
assume that the government should and does represent the public interest. In-
stead, these factors have focused on situations in which the public interest may
diverge. This is important because, where these interests do diverge, the judici-
ary may be the only point at which settlements are reviewed with the public
interest in mind.
Moreover, judicial review can help to sort out situations in which the
government itself does not speak uniformly. A criminal prosecution may be the
product of a referral by regulators as a particularly serious violation, but one
that would otherwise be handled using a civil agreement with a set of compli-
ance terms developed by regulators. The reasonableness and fairness of
agreements with regulatory subject matter may be assessed with reference to
the goals and the enforcement outcomes in similar (or parallel) administrative
proceedings. In addition, the views of the referring agency may also be rele-
vant on the reasonableness of the agreement as these agencies originally had
the capacity to resolve the situation itself
Judges should also consider whether other parallel actions may vindicate
some of the relevant public interests. Further, if other sovereigns are involved,
the public interest may be attenuated. For example, if the conduct and the vic-
tims are foreign, and separate actions abroad are being pursued, judges may
conclude that the public interest of citizens of the United States is attenuated.
Moreover, in general, prosecutions involving foreign corporations may involve
special issues and practical difficulties making settlements particularly desira-
ble, including difficulties in securing access to evidence overseas, challenges
faced in extraditing individuals, jurisdictional obstacles to prosecution or the
enforcement ofjudgments, questions of foreign policy, and matters raising dip-
323lomatic concerns. Of course, there are also concerns that foreign companies
322 See id.
323 See Garrett: Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 3, at 1838, 1852 53, 1856.
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be held to the same legal standards as domestic companies. 324 All of those con-
cerns should be considered carefully when reviewing corporate settlements.
9. Delay
An additional factor is the effect of the period of delay on statutes of limi-
tations or other interests. In some cases, the implementation of an agreed upon
resolution with a corporation will take a considerable period of time. The peri-
od of delay during an agreement may itself be prejudicial to certain types of
interests and worth examining in certain cases. Any consent decree or agree-
ment will typically require some period of time for its implementation (if it did
not, the company would pay a fine but not be subject to any ongoing agree-
ment). During that time, statutes of limitation to pursue charges against indi-
vidual officers or employees may expire, and investigations may be ongo-
325ing. As a result, cooperation of the company during that time may be im-
portant. In general, an organizational prosecution agreement anticipates a
range of future conduct that itself may implicate judicial supervision. The fact
that a judge would require certain assurances that good conduct will result
from an agreement, before approving such an agreement to delay litigation,
and retain authority to supervise a case on the docket, seems quite uncontro-
versial.
10. Informing the Public
A distinct interest that the public shares in resolution of corporate set-
tlements is in obtaining information about conduct that affects the public. The
statements of facts and other documents that can accompany such settlements
may set out what the violations were to give the public an accounting. As de-
scribed, ongoing monitoring can describe the progress of change at a company,
and I have argued that there is a public interest in being informed as to the sta-
tus of that progress. One concern in these cases has been the lack of transpar-
ency in corporate agreements, including a lack of explanation regarding how
fines were calculated, a lack of factual accounting describing who or what was
involved in the relevant violations, and agreements and monitor reports that
have not been made public. In criminal prosecutions of corporations, a compa-
324 See Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the American Bar
Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2 3 (Oct. 16, 2006) (on file with
DOJ).
325 For a discussion of this problem, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scape-
goat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1841-42 (2015). The general federal criminal statute of limitations is
three years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012). Longer statutory periods are available for certain types of
offenses such as conspiracy charges, charges affecting a financial institution, and cases involving
mutual assistance charges. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3292 3293.
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ny must typically admit its responsibility and guilt and do so in detail, with a
326prohibition on contradicting those factual representations.
However, civil agreements may not include nearly as much information.
One of the concerns raised concerning the past use of "neither admit nor deny"
settlements with the SEC was that it was in the public interest to know whether
the company did in fact engage in wrongdoing.327 Judge Rakoff had rejected
the Citigroup I settlement, with its "neither admit nor deny" language, in part
because "the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what the underly-
ing facts are .,,328 Private settlements may be entirely confidential, but to enter
into a settlement with the government that keeps important facts from the pub-
lic is harder to square with the purpose of public enforcement; as Judge Rakoff
put it, the SEC itself has a duty to ensure that "the truth emerges." 329 Similarly,
federal prosecutors have such a duty, and just as in a case resolved by a guilty
plea in which factual admissions are put on the record, 33 ' and court-supervised
probation results in monitor reports put on the record, prosecutors should insist
that the facts are made public in cases resolved through deferred and non-
prosecution agreements.
Admissions of wrongdoing and detailed factual statements also help to
accomplish deterrence: they may affect the reputation of firms, and they may
result in collateral consequences in subsequent litigation.33 13 Apart from those
features of public admissions, corporate enforcement can serve to inform the
public as to the nature of the relevant violations. 332 The public cannot be as-
sured that enforcers are actually acting in the public interest if cases are settled
in a way that the public cannot fully see or understand.
326 Although most corporate prosecution agreements include those features, for the concern that
corporate prosecution agreements do not always include detailed statements of facts or descriptions of
the circumstances of a company's cooperation, see GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 61
63. 327 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
rev 'd and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014); Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Changes Policy on Firms'
Admission of Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/sec-to-
change -policy -on-companies-admission-of-guilt.html [https://perma.cc/Q95Y-YFPF].
328 CitigroupI, 827 F.Supp.2d at 332.3 2 9 Id. at 335.
330 The DOJ permits a nolo contendere orAlford plea that does not include a factual admission of
guilt only in "the most unusual circumstances" and with high-level DOJ approval. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-16.010, .015 (Oct. 2008). AnAlfordplea is "when a de-
fendant maintains his or her innocence with respect to the charge to which he or she offers to plead
guilty." Id. § 9-16.015 (citing North Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).
331 Samuel W. Buell, Liability andAdmissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law,
82 U. CfN. L. REV. 505, 506 12 (2013) [hereinafter Buell: Liability andAdmissions]; Samuel W.
Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity CriminalLiability, 81 IND. L.J. 483, 507 (2006).
332 This can intumbuttress deterrence. "Ifthe enterprise of public prosecution appears unprinci-
pled or even random, then surely deterrence is seriously weakened." Buell: Liability andAdmissions,
supra note 331, at 514.
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C. Deference
Although the judge should consider these functional public interest fac-
tors, in context, the judge must significantly defer to agency priorities and in-
terests in settlement. There will be disagreements on what constitutes the "pub-
lic interest" in certain cases. Therefore, it is important for judges to be trans-
parent in their explanations of how they have weighed the factors involved.
Moreover, when enforcement entities make initial decisions and courts review
them, courts should give deference to those decisions.3 33 I have argued that this
judicial review should not just examine the procedural regularity of settle-
ments, but also their substance. Accordingly, judges should give great defer-
ence to decisions made by enforcers. But, how much deference is due?
The more the settlement conforms to statutory and regulatory procedures
and substance, the more deference should be due. Thus, a plea bargain, within
the range set out by sentencing guidelines, receives a great deal of deference
by a judge. A DPA, in contrast, would not be due the same deference.
In no context in which public interest is a factor is a judge permitted to
substitute an assessment of the public interest entirely for that of the agency.
Agencies must be able to decide whether to pursue adjudication, and in what
form. Any settlement necessarily involves compromise by both sides. Moreo-
ver, agencies must be free to alter their policies or tailor them in individual
cases. The Tunney Act approach requiring an agency to publicly state its rea-
sons for settling a case, and providing evidence to support its consent decree,
provides a useful model. As one scholar has suggested, a court can presume the
public interest is satisfied, absent strong evidence to the contrary, but place the
burden on the agency to initially demonstrate that it has considered all of the
affected interests in deciding to settle the case.334 Similarly, ajudge should not
engage in "rubber stamp approval" of an independent evaluator or monitor, but
should make a separate and independent assessment. 3 This balance between
deference to the agency decision along with an outspoken judicial concern for
the public interest overall helps ensure that corporate settlements are not con-
trary to the public interest.
III. IMPROVING THE LAW AND EQUITY OF CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS
In this Part, I turn to proposals to improve the review of corporate settle-
ments, not just through judicial review, but also through internal regulatory
measures.
... Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (holding "that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer").
114 Shapiro, supra note 29, at 102-03.
115 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974) (a district court "must
eschew any rubber stamp approval in favor of an independent evaluation").
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First, Congress can intervene, as it has in the past, to enact legislation to
provide clearer avenues for the public interest to be considered in corporate
settlements.
Second, prosecutors can implement internal procedural changes to better
account for the public interest and participation by the public. The DOJ has
pushed for more consistency in its process of investigating and charging corpo-
rations, both civilly and criminally. These internal procedural changes, howev-
er, lack any acknowledgement of role for the public interest in these prosecu-
tions. Guidelines internal to the DOJ have been adopted but without notice and
comment or participation by the public. High profile settlements are still en-
tered without meaningful participation of victims or public interest groups.
Third,judicial review under equitable principles can further safeguard the
public interest, ifjudges assert their role more forcefully. I argue that no matter
what the mechanism, the key feature of equitable review should remain central
to efforts to improve corporate settlements: a careful consideration of the pub-
lic interest. As described, thatjudicial review should be more deferential to the
extent a settlement tracks statutory and regulatory procedures and substance.
Less formal settlements negotiated farther outside established procedures and
substance deserve, and should receive, less judicial deference. In this way, the
public interest in corporate settlements can be more protected in a more estab-
lished way while still allowing the settlements outside of statutory procedures
to withstand judicial review.
A. Legislation
Legislation can provide greater or fewer tools to judges when they review
settlements. The Supreme Court has held that the equitable powers of federal
judges are not viewed as restricted by Congress absent a clear statement, a1. ,336
clear and valid legislative command. Courts have followed legislation that
has narrowed judicial review of complex agreements, chiefly in the institution-
al reform setting in civil rights cases, but also regarding corporate settlements
of class actions, without raising any constitutional concerns. Nevertheless,
courts have narrow authority to review corporate settlements, despite legisla-
tion calling for public interest review.337 For example, Congress not only had
to enact the Tunney Act to ensure careful judicial review of the public interest
in antitrust consent decrees, but then amended the Act in 2004 to highlight the
mandatory nature ofjudicial review. 338 Congress intervened to ensure that vic-
tim interests are considered when DPAs are entered.
336 Porterv. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,398 (1946); see Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 329 (1944).
337 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012).
338 See id. § 16(e).
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It is a larger question whether equitable authority to review settlements is
part of the Article III authority of federal judges, and whether the only way to in
fact reduce such power is to deny jurisdiction over a type of case. Regardless,
when legislation does provide for public interest review, judges should carefully
carry out those duties. Congress may increasingly intervene if appellate courts
continue to limit the public interest power of federal judges. Recent legislation
designed to accomplish this goal has been proposed, such as the bipartisan
"Transparency in Settlements" legislation passed by the U.S. Senate but not the
House of Representatives, 339 and no doubt Congress will consider further legis-
lation in the future. When the United Kingdom adopted DPAs, lawmakers set out
in an act, the considerations judges should take into account when deciding
whether to approve them, as well as the process to be followed. 340 Such a statute
could be enacted in the United States as well. Legislation enacted by courts that
further clarifies Congressional concern for the public interest will cause courts to
take up concern for the public interest more frequently.
B. Internal Guidelines
Second, many have observed how internal administrative mechanisms
can regulate enforcement. One solution is for units within agencies to consider
enforcement priorities and solicit input from the public. One scholar has ar-
gued that in the criminal prosecution agreement context, judges may lack "the
expertise or the incentives to intervene to provide genuine oversight," and be-
cause prosecutors have a "tremendous degree of discretion," it falls to prosecu-
tors to create more specific guidelines to govern such settlements.34' Indeed, a
proliferating approach among agencies is to issue guidelines for enforce-
342
ment. There are even guidelines emphasizing the importance of issuing
more guidelines. Thus, the DOI has emphasized in recent years that: "Every
United States Attorney's Office and Department litigating component should
have policies and procedures for early and appropriate coordination of the
government's criminal, civil, regulatory, and administrative remedies.,
343
These guidelines, however, have tended not to discuss issues specific to en-
forcement against corporations and the equitable decisions that must be made
when designing such matters. Therefore, it is increasingly important for these
"9 See Truth in Settlements Act of 2015, S. 1109, 114th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Sept. 21,
2015).
141 Crime and Courts Act of 2013, c. 22, § 45, sch. 17 (Eng.).
341 Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule ofLaw: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through
DeferredProsecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 228 30 (2016).
342 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries andInformalAgency Policymaking, 92 COR-
NELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2007).
14' ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: 2013, supra note 312, § 1-12.000.
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agencies to review their internal procedures related to enforcement against
corporations.
Another approach is to create specialized oversight within enforcement
agencies to coordinate enforcement and adopt uniform approaches towards
remedies. One professor has described such "offices of goodness," including
offices designed to ensure protection of civil rights and civil liberties.344 There
may also be pressure from other agencies placed upon enforcement agencies,
when there is a disconnect between their approaches.345 Many agencies have
adopted cooperation agreements, formal and informal, to coordinate enforce-
ment in complex corporate cases.346
In the criminal context, charging factors are laid out in guidelines, as well
as procedural rules for appointing monitors, among the topics addressed in de-
tail, but not the substance of the terms of those complex agreements. For cor-
porate prosecution agreements, the main DOI Fraud Section has created a
compliance counsel position to advise the DOI on complex compliance is-
sues. 347 And, to be sure, the DOI is right to have "no formulaic requirements
regarding corporate compliance programs. 348 Without adopting rigid require-
ments that do suit the variety of corporations and cases, the DOI could insist
that compliance be rigorously audited utilizing industry-specific best practices.
Where many agreements lack much specificity concerning compliance or how
it is to be implemented, the DOT and other agencies could go much further.
Of course, there is also a concern that centralizing review and oversight
could harm experimentation and innovation, and make it easier for the industry
to capture the process and promote less stringent enforcement remedies. 349 In-
formal guidelines do not have the status of regulations. They can therefore be
more easily changed from one administration to the next, offering less certain-
ty to companies. And even if there are guidelines for corporate remedies, it will
still be important for judges to conduct review to ensure that they are adhered
to and that the public interest is observed. Changes to internal regulations in
administrative bodies may aid in settlements where the underlying issues relate
to the specialized knowledge of these agencies, but the need to protect the pub-
144 Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence WithoutAuthority in FederalAgencies, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 54 56 (2014).
145 See Barkow, supra note 185, at 1153 54.
14' Regarding DOJ efforts, see supra note 343 and accompanying text.
147 New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download [https://penna.cc/DA3M-TK7L].
348 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.800 (Aug. 2008) (Corporate
Compliance Programs).
149 Arlen- supra note 341, at 231 ("Many administrative agencies also are subject to capture; in
addition, independent agencies that are runby a five-person politically-divided commission often find
it difficult to take genuine aggressive actionto deter corporate crime."). Forthe reverse argument that
the DOJ could benefit from monitoring and compliance of prosecutors' work, see generally Rachel
Barkow, Organizational Guidelinesfor the Prosecutor's Office, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 2089 (2010).
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lic interest in these settlements does not absolve the parties from the potential
need for judicial review.
C. Judicial Review
Why have courts of appeals occasionally tried to tie the hands of district
judges? What was most troubling about the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Fokker III,
as with its ruling two decades earlier in Microsoft, was not the result (defensi-
ble in both cases), but the reasoning emphasizing that legislation should be
interpreted to maximize executive discretion in settling criminal cases.35° In
contrast, the Second Circuit's ruling in Citigroup II emphasized the need for a
judge to stay within the boundaries of a consent decree, but it did not carefully
preserve the role of ajudge to review whether an agreement comports with the
public interest.351 Where the D.C. Circuit's canon of legislative construction
came from is hard to say, but in both cases, it represents a remarkable abdica-
tion of the crucial Article III role in assuring that settlements entered in court
satisfy the public interest as a matter of equity. The public interest was no-
where discussed in those two opinions, except in an implicit assumption that
whatever the government decides to do necessarily represents the public inter-
est. That is where the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit panels got it wrong. The
equitable power of Article III judges cannot be so blithely constrained. Judges,
as described, may modify consent decrees and other settlements using equita-
ble powers, although judges are supposed to protect federal interests and defer
to expertise of enforcement agencies.352
Congress has wisely intervened to enact legislation protecting that role,
including in the Tunney Act and to protect certain victim rights in such de-
ferred prosecution settlements.353 Although such legislation is desirable, and
can define and bound judicial review of settlements, no such legislation should
be needed. As I have argued, judicial review is most important and should be
least deferential in areas in which there is not legislation or regulations that
provide guidance for settlements in enforcement actions. At a minimum, Arti-
cle III equitable powers remain intact unless clearly limited by valid legisla-
tion. Fortunately, courts continue to emphasize the importance of the judicial
review to safeguard the public interest in a range of contexts. It is unfortunate,
351 See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker III), 818 F.3d 733, 750 51 (D.C. Cir 2016);
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452.
351 See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I1), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014).
352 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cly. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (describing a consent de-
cree as "an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a
judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to otherjudgments and decrees"); Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
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though, that the influential D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal
have, from time to time, taken such narrow approaches towards the responsi-
bilities of districtjudges to review and supervise corporate settlements.
CONCLUSION
In approving the DPA with HSBC, Judge John Gleeson warned that a set-
tlement of a federal criminal case is "not window dressing," and a federal
judge is not "a potted plant." 354 Or, as another court put it, "[a]lthough the
court's discretion should be exercised in favor of the strong policy favoring
voluntary settlement of litigation, when reviewing a consent decree, a district
court must independently scrutinize its terms and avoid 'rubber stamp ap-
proval. 355 Or, continuing with that theme, another court found courts may not
"merely imprimit [the parties'] decision as though possessed of a clerical rub-
ber stamp. 356 Whether the case is civil or criminal, and regardless what form
the settlement takes, the public interest is an inherent part of ajudge's equita-
ble power to approve and supervise an injunctive degree. Yet, that judicial role
has been neglected and eroded in the context of some types of corporate set-
tlements, including those in which judicial review should be the least deferen-
tial. Judges have acted like potted plants and appellate courts have relegated to
them a rubber-stamp role, even in the face of federal statutes to the contrary
and settlements that take place outside statutory and regulatory guidelines.
Judicial supervision must take many forms in complex agreements that
anticipate complex and lengthy injunctive remedies. The role of the judge be-
gins with the decision whether to approve the agreement; to supervise ajudg-
ment entered in a civil consent decree, a criminal plea bargain or a more in-
formal DPA; to resolve any disputes that occur during the pendency of the
agreement; and to decide whether and when to narrow the remedies or termi-
nate an agreement as having been satisfied. Any type of corporate agreement
filed in court that calls for injunctive remedies implicates the equitable power
of ajudge to consider the public interest.
The public interest standard must be informed so that judges exercise
meaningful review that protects the public interest and participation rights, as
well as respects the discretion and judgment of government agencies. Judge
Rakoff expressed the concern in Citigroup I that
[t]he injunctive power of the judiciary is not a free-roving remedy to
be invoked at the whim of a regulatory agency, even with the con-
154 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBCI), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev 'd, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017).
155 Turtle Island, 834 F. Supp.2d at 1009 (quoting United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal.,
50 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1995)).
151 United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (D. Colo. 1994).
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sent of the regulated. If its deployment does not rest on facts-cold,
hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by trials-it
serves no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of op-
- 357pression.
Judges require both facts and guiding factors to inform their review and super-
vision through injunctive action. Fortunately, judges have developed factors to
inform their review in several contexts, and that case law can inform consider-
ation of the public interest in corporate settlements.
The complexity of corporate agreements and their public importance pro-
vides all the more reason to conduct a careful individualized review of their
fairness and reasonableness before approval. Doing so may safeguard the pub-
lic interest, as with the judicial review of plea agreements and civil settle-
ments. Careful judicial review can avoid unnecessary disputes during the im-
plementation of corporate agreements with an organization. More comprehen-
sive judicial review, where the parties negotiate outside statutory and regulato-
ry bounds, can incentivize more regularized settlement practices. The multi-
billion dollar settlements that have proliferated raise substantial public interest
concerns, from the perspectives of public interest groups, industry groups, and
citizens. Clearer guidance on the scope and goals of remedies, and independent
review of content and implementation would benefit all sides. After all, as the
U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized, some agreements may need to be strength-
ened to accomplish the public interest, while others may need to be narrowed
or terminated, where "enforcement of the decree without modification would
be detrimental to the public interest.,
358
In this Article, I have made the case that the public interest is central to
the equitable role of federal judges when considering corporate settlements of
all stripes. An examination of the public interest is notjust within the capacity
of federal judges, it is at the core of their responsibility when approving and
supervising detailed corporate settlements that call for ongoing remedies. All
corporate agreements filed in a federal court demand a rigorous, informed, and
careful consideration of the public interest.
157 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
rev 'd and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
358 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cry. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992).
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